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The Supreme Court's traditional analysis of state actions under the
dormant commerce clause' has undergone two important modifications
over the past decade.2 In the first, the Court established a rule under
which certain state actions that are within the scope of the dormant
commerce clause may be deemed per se invalid, without inquiry into the
extent to which the challenged state action burdens interstate commerce
or furthers legitimate local objectives.3 In the second, the Court
fashioned a threshold inquiry to determine whether state action
constitutes "market participation,"' 4 in which case it lies outside the
scope of commerce clause scrutiny even if it burdens interstate
commerce.5 Thus, the two developments place certain state actions
beyond the traditional reach of the clause and cause others to be
subjected to less scrutiny than provided for in traditional analysis.
As a result of these two developments, certain state actions taking
the form of market participation will be summarily upheld that would, in
1. See infra note 15 and accompanying text (outlining the origin of the dormant commerce
clause).
2. See infra section I.
3. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978); see also infra notes 24-
40 and accompanying text.
4. The concept of market participation first appeared in a Supreme Court case in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976), where it referred to "the entry by the State itself
into the market as a purchaser . . . of a potential article of interstate commerce." In subsequent
cases, the Court has expanded the term "market participation" to include all state proprietary
action, see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 433 (1980) (affirming holding of district court that
Alexandria Scrap allows a state to act in a proprietary capacity without violating the commerce
clause), and compared it to "the long recognized right of a trader . . . freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal," White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 207 n.3 (1983) (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S.
300, 307 (1919)).
5. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976); see also infra notes 41-
162 and accompanying text.
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a different form, be summarily struck down as invalid per se.6 The per se
rule summarily invalidates state actions that enact trade barriers to
interstate commerce.7 Current analysis under the market participant test
allows those obstructions that are classified as market participation to
stand.8 This note begins by describing the origin of this anomaly.9 It
then discusses the Supreme Court's extension of the privileges and
immunities clause to reach state actions that implement economic
protectionism 10 but avoid commerce clause strictures." Next, the note
explains why the privileges and immunities clause has only limited
usefulness in reaching such cases.' 2 The note proposes modifications of
both the market participant test and the per se rule of invalidity that
6. One such case is White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1983), discussed infra at notes 110-128 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 41-162 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 15-162 and accompanying text.
10. The term "economic protectionism" has been used by the Court to describe attempts by
states to advance or protect the economic interests of its own citizens by restricting the movement of
articles of interstate commerce either into or out of the state. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v, New
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). This note employs this traditional meaning of the term.
The dormant commerce clause's proscription of economic protectionism is derived from the
constitutional principle that "the State may not promote its own economic advantages by
curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce." H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
532 (1949). "The clearest example of [protectionism] is a law that overtly blocks the flow of
interstate commerce at a State's border." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978).
Some protectionist state measures block the flow of commerce into a state; others attempt to
prevent the flow of commerce out of the state. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935),
illustrates an example of the first type. In that case, the Court invoked the dormant commerce
clause to strike down a New York statute designed to insulate resident milk producers from out-of-
state competition. Id. at 522. The Baldwin Court stated:
What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another may not place
itself in a position of economic isolation. . . . Neither the power to tax nor the police
power may be used by the state of destination with the aim and effect of establishing an
economic barrier against competition with the products of another State or the labor of its
residents.
Id. at 527.
West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), quoted with approval in Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979), illustrates a state's impermissible attempt to obstruct outgo-
ing commerce. The Court in West made clear that a state could not, consistent with the dictates of
the commerce clause, jealously guard its natural resources (gas, in this case) from export:
If the States have such power a singular situation might result. Pennsylvania might keep
its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining States their minerals. . . .[E]mbargo may be
retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines. . . . [Congress's power
over interstate commerce] is constituted of the welfare of all of the States and that of each
State is made the greater by a division of its resources, natural and created, with every
other State, and those of every other State with it. This was the purpose, as it is the result,
of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.
221 U.S. at 255.
11. See infra notes 163-200 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
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would exempt from commerce clause scrutiny only those state actions
not motivated solely by economic protectionism and would subject to
heightened scrutiny state regulations that discriminate against interstate
commerce.1 3 Finally, the note discusses Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin
Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations,14 which the
Supreme Court will decide this term. Gould highlights the existing
inadequacy of dormant commerce clause analysis. Application of the
proposed modifications to Gould illustrates the benefits of these proposed
revisions.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
ANALYSIS
A. Traditional Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis.
The Supreme Court developed dormant commerce clause doctrine
as a check on the power of the states to pass laws that burdened inter-
state commerce.' 5 Justice Marshall first coined the term "dormant" to
describe the power of the clause, even in the absence of conflicting federal
13. See infra notes 218-40 and accompanying text.
14. No. 84-1484, prob. jurik noted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (U.S. May 20, 1985); see also infra notes
241-62 and accompanying text.
15. The dormant commerce clause is one of "the great silences of the Constitution." H.P.
Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949). The Constitution does not expressly prohibit
state regulation of interstate commerce; instead, it grants affirmative power to Congress to regulate
commerce "among the several States," U.S. CONST. art I. § 8, cl. 3. In a set of early cases, the
Supreme Court read into this provision a negative implication, based on the premise that
"[w]henever the terms in which a power is granted to congress, or the nature of the power, require[s]
that it should be exercised exclusively by congress, the subject is as completely taken from the state
legislatures, as if they had been expressly forbidden to act on it," Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819) (Marshall, C.J., construing bankruptcy clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4, granting to Congress power to create bankruptcy laws). Justice Marshall first clearly implied that
the commerce clause gave Congress exclusive power that precluded state interference with interstate
commerce in dictum in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) (finding persuasive the
argument that "the word 'to regulate' implies in its nature, full power over the thing to be regulated
[i.e., commerce]; it excludes, necessarily, the action of all others [i.e., the states] that would perform
the same operation on the same thing").
As strong an advocate of centralized national power as he was, however, see generally McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426-29 (1819) (upholding constitutionality of the national
bank); Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. REV. 217, 221 (1955),
Marshall recognized that a state should be permitted, in pursuing a legitimate state goal, to take
action that affected interstate commerce. See, e.g., Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 245 (1829). In Willson, Delaware authorized the draining of a swampy, navigable creek to
improve health and the property value of adjoining land. See id. at 251. Acknowledging that this
act would have violated the commerce clause "[i]f Congress had passed any act which bore upon the
case .... ," id. at 252, Marshall nonetheless concluded that in the absence of preemptive federal
legislation, the state's act was not "repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant
state." Id. at 253.
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statutes, to preempt state regulation affecting interstate commerce. 16
The Court used this judicial creation17 to prohibit state regulation in
those areas where federal rather than state legislation was more appropri-
ate. In this way, the Court promoted the framers' intent to ensure a na-
tionwide economy in which all producers had free access to all
consumers, unobstructed by local protectionism.1
8
In its traditional balancing approach to dormant commerce clause
cases, the Supreme Court focused not on the form but on the effect of the
Marshall's successor, Chief Justice Taney, believed that the commerce clause had no implicit
power to invalidate state law, but only functioned to preempt such law when it conflicted with valid
federal legislation enacted under the clause. See, eg., The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 574
(1847) (separate opinion) ("[Tlhe power of Congress over [commerce] does not extend further than
the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States; . . . beyond these
limits the States have never surrendered their power over trade and commerce, and may still exercise
it .... "). Thirty-five years earlier, Chancellor Kent expressed a similar view in Livingston v. Von
Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 578 (N.Y. 1812). For a full discussion of the debate between those who, like
Marshall, read negative implications into the commerce clause and those who, like Taney and Kent,
supported concurrent state and federal jurisdiction over commerce, see Sholley, The Negative Impli.
cations of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556, 565-88 (1936).
The Supreme Court first invalidated a state statute under the dormant commerce clause in The
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 559 (1849) (invalidating New York and Massachusetts laws
requiring that ship masters carrying sick and poor passengers into port post bonds for those that
would need medical attention or might become dependent on the state). In the final seminal case,
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 317-19 (1851), the Court held that the dormant
commerce clause only operated to restrict state regulation of those aspects of interstate commerce so
national in character as to require uniformity. This practical approach-which distinguished condi-
tions that could best be addressed by local response from those in which uniformity was required to
assure the unimpeded flow of interstate commerce-accounts for the characterization of Cooley as
the "bridge" to modem commerce clause analysis. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 6-4, at 324-25 (1978); see also infra note 19.
16. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 253 (1829).
17. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (restraints on state power
to pass laws affecting interstate commerce in absence of federal legislation "appear nowhere in the
words of the Commerce Clause, but have emerged gradually in the decisions of this Court giving
effect to its basic purpose").
18. The Court has often justified the development of an implicit constitutional restriction on the
power of states to restrict commerce as effectuating the basic purpose of the commerce clause:
This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers
necessary to control of the economy, including the vital power of erecting customs barriers
against foreign competition, has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic
units. . . . [W]hat is ultimate is the principle that one state in its dealings with another
may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.
Id. at 623 (citations omitted).
More broadly, the Court has stated that the entire Constitution "was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523
(1935). To this end, "no other federal power [than over commerce] was so universally assumed to be
necessary" to prevent fractiousness among the states in competition for business. See H.P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-34 (1949).
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challenged state action.' 9 It weighed the effect of burdening interstate
commerce against the effect of furthering legitimate state goals.20 As
part of this balancing of burden and benefit, the Court considered
whether the subject matter of the state action was one better controlled
at the local level, 21 and whether local objectives could be achieved in
19. The balancing approach in its original form was applied formalistically: "direct" burdens
on commerce were invalid; "indirect" burdens were permissible. See, e.g., Shafer v. Farmers Grain
Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925) (distinguishing "incidental" and "direct" restraints). This apparently
rigid labelling of state regulations often masked the more fluid balancing of national and local inter-
ests that underlay application of the labels. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 273 (2d ed. 1983). Advocacy of a more explicit balancing approach seems to have
begun with Justice Stone's dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927). J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 274-75. In Di Santo, the majority invalidated Pennsylvania's
law licensing sellers of steamboat tickets by characterizing it as a direct interference with foreign
commerce. Di Santo, 273 U.S. at 37. In his dissent, Justice Stone urged that the Court abandon the
unhelpful direct/indirect distinction in favor of a more realistic approach:
[T]he traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with
commerce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application,
and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions...
we are doing little more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy
formula by which it is reached.
[I]t seems clear that those interferences not deemed forbidden are to be sus-
tained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally indirect, but because a considera-
tion of all the facts and circumstances, such as the nature of the regulation, its function, the
character of the business involved and the actual effect on the flow of commerce, lead to
the conclusion that the regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe
the national interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines.
Id. at 44 (Stone, J., dissenting).
Stone's dissent became the basis for an influential article by Professor Noel T. Dowling, Inter-
state Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1940), who elaborated Justice Stone's call
to the Court to adopt an explicit balancing approach. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG supra,
at 274-75. The Court did so, beginning with Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). In
that case, the Court struck down an Arizona law limiting the number of passenger and freight cars
that trains could pull. Id. at 775-80, 783-84. It posed as the "decisive" question "whether in the
circumstances the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so
slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free
from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local regulation which does not have a
uniform effect on the interstate train journey which it interrupts." Id. at 775-76.
20. See, eg., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (acceptable scope of state
regulation for commerce clause purposes is often matter of "delicate adjustment"); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local benefits."); Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960) (in determin-
ing whether state regulation has been preempted, courts must keep in mind that the Constitution
does not cut off all state regulation of health and safety that has an indirect effect on interstate
commerce); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945) (recognizing the "infinite
variety of cases, in which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce,
in which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be attained only by
some appraisal and accomodation of the competing demands of the state and national interests
involved").
21. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767-70 (1945) (states have broad
discretion over matters of local concern but none in matters requiring nationwide uniformity).
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ways less burdensome to interstate commerce. 22 If the burden on com-
merce was sufficiently slight in comparison to the benefit to local con-
cerns, the statute was upheld.
23
B. The Per Se Rule of Invalidity.
The Supreme Court recently abandoned the traditional balancing
approach in cases "where simple economic protectionism is effected by
state legislation" and adopted a "virtually per se rule of invalidity. '24
Before the adoption of this new approach in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 25 the Court subjected statutes that on their face treated interstate
commerce differently from intrastate commerce to the traditional balanc-
ing approach, permitting a state to advance reasons for the differential
treatment.26 Under the per se rule, credible, legitimate state purposes
for discriminating against interstate commerce are unavailing. 27
The Court in City ofPhiladelphia struck down a New Jersey statute
prohibiting the importation of most solid or liquid wastes originating or
collected outside the state.28 New Jersey strenuously argued that it en-
acted the law solely to protect the state's environment while additional
landfills and alternative disposal methods were developed. 29 The Court
deemed irrelevant whether the state's ultimate purpose was to protect its
environment, or, as the plaintiffs maintained, to stabilize the cost of
waste disposal for New Jersey residents. 30 The Court flatly concluded
22. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951) (in assessing a
statute, the issue is whether the discrimination against out-of-state commerce "can be justified in
view of the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting them").
23. Eg., South Carolina State Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding
regulation limiting the weight and width of vehicles using state's highways).
24. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
25. Id.
26. Eg., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951), discussed infra note
234; see also cases cited infra note 34, all of which treat discriminatory state action with the tradi-
tional balancing approach.
27. The Supreme Court first coined the phrase "per se rule of invalidity" in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), in a narrower context. It classified as "virtually per se"
invalid "state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could
more efficiently be performed elsewhere." Id. It is clear that although such measures may further
legitimate state interests, their primary purpose is to protect a state's own inhabitants from out-of-
state competition. See id. at 146; H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949). The per
se rule articulated in City of Philadelphia expanded the concept of what is per se impermissible to
include statutes that are not primarily intended to benefit the economic interests of state residents,
but have that effect. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
28. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618.
29. Id. at 625 (quoting the finding of the New Jersey legislature, set out in the challenged
statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:11-10 (West 1978), that "the public health, safety and welfare require
that the treatment within this State of all wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited").
30. Id. at 626-27.
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"[W]hatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished
by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the
State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them
differently."
'31
The per se rule is broadly worded to reach statutes that discriminate
against out-of-state commerce either intentionally-for protection of lo-
cal economic interests-or in effect. 32 To the extent that the holding in
City of Philadelphia would invalidate statutes passed with the intent of
furthering legitimate local objectives, 33 the per se rule goes beyond earlier
cases cited in the opinion, all of which struck down statutes with the
impermissible aim of protecting local industry from out-of-state competi-
tion or enhancing local employment.34 Supreme Court cases after City of
Philadelphia have re-emphasized that regardless of their purpose, stat-
utes that discourage the flow of interstate commerce without burdening
31. Id. The qualification in the wording of the virtually per se rule, allowing for discrimination
against items of interstate commerce for reasons apart from their origin, appears to refer to quaran-
tine laws. See id. at 628-29. Quarantine laws have been upheld because they "did not discriminate
against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their
origin." Id. at 629. Thus, the qualification of the per se rule is entirely consistent with earlier
decisions of the Supreme Court recognizing that "a state may regulate the importation of unhealthy
swine or cattle or decayed or noxious foods," Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 525
(1935) (citations omitted). But see The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 57, 62 (1978)
(suggesting that Court's qualification is not limited to quarantine laws and leaves door open for the
balancing test under circumstances that are still undefined).
32. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626 ("[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legisla-
tive means as well as legislative ends.").
33. See supra text accompanying note 31. The Court in City of Philadelphia made no finding
that the challenged statute was passed with protectionist intent. Indeed, the absence of a particular-
ized local benefit was implied by the fact that New Jersey landfill operators were among the plaintiffs
challenging the law. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 619.
34. See id. at 624, 627. The Court cited the following cases in support of the "virtually per se
rule of invalidity": H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533-40 (1949) (denial to Massa-
chusetts milk distributor of permission to acquire additional facilities in New York held unconstitu-
tional because it was intended to suppress out-of-state competition and it impermissibly burdened
interstate commerce; Court distinguished permissible purpose of protecting health and safety of citi-
zens from impermissible purpose of burdening flow of interstate commerce for its own citizens' eco-
nomic advantage); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-06 (1948) (statute requiring that shrimp
caught in state be packed there impermissibly burdened flow of interstate commerce out of state for
purpose of enhancing state employment); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173-77 (1941) (crimi-
nal statute punishing transportation into state of indigents, enacted to protect state financial re-
sources, impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 521-26 (1935) (statute requiring that milk brought from out of state be sold at mini-
mum price set by state, designed to protect state farmers from competition, impermissibly discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 12-14
(1928) (statute requiring that shrimp caught in state be processed there, designed to benefit local
processors, impermissibly blocked flow of items of interstate commerce out of state); Buck v. Kuy-
kendall, 267 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1925) (denial by state of permit to operate auto stage line, based on
desire to discourage out-of-state competition, impermissibly burdened interstate commerce).
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intrastate commerce to the same extent are per se invalid. 35
Following the broad rule of City of Philadelphia, the traditional test,
in which the Court balances the extent to which a state action burdens
interstate commerce against the extent to which it benefits local con-
cerns, will be applied only when the statute regulates evenhandedly. To
fall within this category, statutes may only burden interstate commerce
and out-of-state businesses to the same extent as they do intrastate com-
merce and in-state businesses. 36 For example, in Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery,37 the Court upheld Minnesota's ban on the retail sale of
milk in plastic, nonreturnable containers. Finding that the ban affected
commerce in milk to the same extent whether the milk originated inside
or outside the state, and thus burdened commerce evenhandedly,3 8 the
Court applied a balancing approach. It characterized the burden on in-
terstate commerce as slight and the benefit to local conservation efforts as
significant.39 Important in its decision to sustain the law was the absence
of less burdensome alternatives that would effectively achieve legitimate
state goals.4°
35. See, e.g., Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 29, 36-37, 44 (1980) (striking down
Florida statute restricting ownership of in-state financial services by out-of-state banks, and finding
that state's interest in protecting local consumers, though permissible, was irrelevant in light of effect
of statute, which was to discriminate against interstate commerce).
36. See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; see also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142 (1970) (limiting use of balancing approach to evenhanded regulations of commerce).
Two reasons justify the Court's differential treatment of regulations that evenhandedly burden
interstate and intrastate commerce. First, because the burden of evenhanded regulation falls on local
economic interests as well as on other states' economic interests, affected voters within the state can
use the state's own political processes to check unduly burdensome regulations. Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978); see South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 187 (1938) (fact that state highway regulations "affect alike shippers in inter-
state and intrastate commerce in large number within as well as without the state is a safeguard
against their abuse"). Second, the extent to which a statute exempts state economic interests from
the burden of regulation often casts doubt on the strength or existence of a permissible objective. See
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-78 (1981). For example, an Iowa
statute generally prohibited trucks longer than fifty-five feet from using its interstate highways. See
id. It excepted, however, those trucks travelling to Iowa's border cities, and those carrying livestock.
Given the breadth and the nature of the exceptions, the Court doubted the usefulness of the statute
in furthering Iowa's articulated purpose of decreasing highway accidents and road wear. See id.
37. 449 U.S. 456, 458, 470 (1981).
38. Id. at 471-72. Similar to City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626, the presence among the
plaintiffs of Minnesota dairies and plastic bottle producers indicated the absence of protectionist
effect, and-if one supposes that protectionist measures often originate with special interest groups-
protectionist intent. See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 458 n.1; see also supra note 33 and accompanying
text. Unlike City of Philadelphia, the Clover Leaf Court found no discriminatory impact in Minne-
sota's plan. Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-72.
39. See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 472-73.
40. See id. at 473-74.
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C. The Market Participant Test.
With its articulation of the market participant test in 1976, the
Supreme Court added as a threshold determination whether the chal-
lenged state action was the kind of action with which the commerce
clause was concerned or, instead, merely "market participation" by the
state, and thus beyond the reach of the clause.41 In contrast to the tradi-
tional balancing approach, 42 the market participant test centers on the
form rather than on the effect or intent of the state action. Action by the
state resembling that of a private trader constitutes market participa-
tion.43 The Court first articulated this test in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp. 44 Subsequently, the Court has elaborated the market participant
41. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810, 814 (1976).
42. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 4.
44. 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). The notion that certain types of state actions should be differenti-
ated for the purpose of determining whether the action constitutes an impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce had arisen in earlier state court decisions and in one lower federal court case. In
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 n.9 (1980), the Court cited the following state cases to
support its proposition that "Alexandria Scrap does not stand alone": City of Phoenix v. Superior
Court, 109 Ariz. 533, 535, 514 P.2d 454, 456 (1973) (en bane) (upholding against commerce clause
challenge state statute giving preference to bids of contractors paying state property taxes); Schrey v.
Allison Steel Mfg. Co., 75 Ariz. 282, 287, 255 P.2d 604, 607 (1953) (earlier case upholding same
statute considered in City of Phoenix; "the state, in contracting for the expenditure of tax money, had
a reasonable basis for granting a five percent preference to contractors who, through the payment of
taxes for two years, have made a contribution to the funds from which they are to reap a benefit");
City of Denver v. Bossie, 83 Colo. 329, 333-34, 266 P. 214, 216-17 (1928) (en banc) (upholding
against commerce clause attack municipal ordinance requiring that all stone used in public works be
worked, dressed, or carved within the city); Ex parte Gemmill, 20 Idaho 732, 741-42, 119 P. 298,
301-02 (1911) (statutes requiring that state and county printing, binding, and stationery work be
done within state did not violate commerce, due process, or equal protection clauses; the state "act-
ing [for the people] ha[s] a right to enter into contracts and make purchases"); People ex rel Holland
v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 111. 2d 258, 275-76, 335 N.E.2d 469, 479-80 (1975) (holding unconstitu-
tional portions of Illinois statute limiting public works contracts to contractors who used only Illi-
nois laborers, but finding that, in general, state can give preference to its residents on public works,
as distinct from regulating private industry); Dixon-Paul Printing Co. v. Board of Pub. Contracts,
117 Miss. 83, 86, 77 So. 908, 908-09 (1918) (upholding against fourteenth amendment challenge state
statute allowing bids for public printing contracts only by state residents and absolutely preferring
resident printing plants in awarding such contracts); State ex rel Collins v. Senatobia Blank Book &
Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 265, 76 So. 258, 261 (1917) (upholding against equal protection,
privileges and immunities, and commerce clause challenges a state statute requiring that county
supervisors contract only with state residents for blank books and stationery); Allen v. Labsap, 188
Mo. 692, 699-700, 87 S.W. 926, 928 (1905) (rejecting fourteenth amendment, privileges and immuni-
ties, and commerce clause challenges in upholding municipal ordinance requiring that rock and
granite used in public buildings be dressed within state); Hersey v. Neilson, 47 Mont. 132, 148-49,
131 P. 30, 34 (1913) (upholding against commerce clause attack a statute requiring counties to
contract only with in-state suppliers for paper products; "[t]he state speaks through its legislature,
and in our opinion has the same right that any individual citizen has to declare that it will procure its
supplies. . . from a [state] concern"); Luboil Heat & Power Corp. v. Playdell, 178 Misc. 562, 564,
34 N.Y.S.2d 587, 591 (Super. Ct. 1942) (upholding against commerce clause challenge a resolution
by city Board of Estimates giving preference to state suppliers in awards of contracts for all city
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test in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,45 White v. Massachusetts Council of Con-
struction Employers,46 United Building & Construction Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden,47 and South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke.48 In all but the last of these cases, the Court summarily up-
held state activity that, because it discriminated against interstate com-
merce, would otherwise have been per se invalid under City of
Philadelphia.49
1. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. In Alexandria Scrap, the
Court addressed for the first time "the question whether, when a state
enters the market as purchaser for end use of items in interstate com-
merce, it may [restrict] its trade to its own citizens or businesses within
the state." 50 The statutes attacked were designed by Maryland to remove
abandoned autos from state highways. 5' Maryland paid a bounty to li-
censed scrap processors for the destruction of those auto hulks formerly
titled in the state.52 For the scrap processors to receive the bounty, how-
ever, they had to obtain specific documentation from the wrecker who
purchases); Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 906 (1898)
(upholding against commerce clause attack statute requiring counties to contract only with in-state
suppliers of paper products).
Reeves cites, as a federal case consistent with its holding, American Yearbook Co. v. Askew,
339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.), afjfd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972). In American Yearbook, a district
court dismissed an action by a yearbook manufacturer challenging the constitutionality of a Florida
statute requiring that certain classes of state contracts for printing be performed within the state.
See id. at 719-20, 720 nn.l-4, 725. The plaintiff attacked the statute as a violation of the commerce
clause and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 720. In rejecting the
equal protection challenge, the district court characterized the award of public contracts as a propri-
etary function. Id. at 721 (citing Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and Atkin v. Kansas, 191
U.S. 207, 222-24 (1903) (upholding state's right to restrict number of hours those employed on city
projects could work)). When exercising a proprietary power, a state "is subject to no more limitation
than a private individual or corporation would be in transacting the same business." Id. The district
court distinguished, for purposes of commerce clause analysis, instances in which a state statute
impermissibly burdened interstate commerce through regulation of private industry, citing as exam-
ples Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935), and Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v.
Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964). American Yearbook, 339 F. Supp. at 724-25.
45. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
46. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
47. 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
48. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
49. See infra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
50. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 821 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting majority opinion, id. at 808); see id. at 821 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court had summarily affirmed American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.),
a.f'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972)); cf Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 190-91 (1915) (rejecting four-
teenth amendment and commerce clause challenges to New York City ordinance preferring New
York citizens in city public works).
51. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 796.
52. Id. at 797.
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supplied the junked cars and submit it to the state.53 The state required
more complete documentation from out-of-state processors than it did
from in-state processors,54 apparently because the legislature had con-
cluded that cars brought to out-of-state processors were less likely to
have come from the sides of Maryland roads.5 5 Reversing the district
court decision 5 6 the Supreme Court held that the bounty program vio-
lated neither the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause57 nor the
commerce clause.58
In upholding Maryland's program, the Court reasoned that not
"every action by a state that has the effect of reducing in some manner
the flow of goods in interstate commerce is potentially an impermissible
burden. '5 9 Although the Court recognized that the effect of the program
was to reduce the movement of junked cars interstate, 60 discriminating
between in-state processors and out-of-state processors in the purchase of
autos was not "the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause is
concerned. ' 61 Thus, in articulating its new test, the Court emphasized
the form, not the effect, of the state activity.
Still, Alexandria Scrap did not unequivocally establish the market
participant test as one that completely barred further inquiry into the
53. Id. at 798.
54. See id. at 800 & n.10, 801.
55. See id. at 813-14.
56. Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391 F. Supp. 46 (D. Md. 1975) (three judge panel).
57. The Alexandria Scrap court quickly dispensed with an equal protection challenge to Mary-
land's plan, subjecting it to only minimum scrutiny. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 814. The
Court determined that the Maryland program, discriminating between resident and nonresident auto
processors, bore a "rational relationship to Maryland's purpose of using its limited funds to clean up
its own environment." Id. (citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) (applying the
rational relation test to uphold welfare program) and San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 44 (1973) (rational relation test applied to differential educational expenditures by the
state)). The statutory classification based on residency did not directly further Maryland's goal of
eliminating cars left on Maryland highways. It was, instead, based on the assumption that Maryland
auto processors were more likely to supply cars abandoned in Maryland than were non-Maryland
auto processors. Since no fundamental right was involved, such a classification, dealing with eco-
nomic matters, did not have to be drawn with precision. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 813. As long
as Maryland's assumption was reasonable, its statutory scheme did not violate equal protection
rights, even though some non-Maryland auto processors might be deprived of a right to sell cars that
were in fact abandoned in Maryland. See id. at 813 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 349 U.S.
483, 489 (1955)).
58. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810, 814.
59. Id. at 805.
60. See id. at 803 & n.13. "The practical effect [of Maryland's program] was substantially the
same as if Maryland had withdrawn altogether the availability of bounties . . . to licensed non-
Maryland processors." Id. at 803 n.13.
61. Id. at 805 (emphasis added).
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effect of the state statute on commerce. 62 The case is susceptible to the
interpretation that the Court found no impermissible burden on inter-
state commerce, and used the term "market participation" to describe a
type of activity that affected commerce without impermissibly burdening
it.63 Certainly, several other aspects of the program, related to the state's
purpose, were on the Court's mind: Maryland did not create the pro-
gram as a protectionist measure;64 it was using limited funds in an effort
to clean up the environment; 65 and the complex statutory scheme was a
creative exercise of a "[s]tate's right to experiment with different incen-
tives to business."' 66 Thus, while purporting to conclude as a threshold
matter that Maryland's action was beyond the scope of dormant com-
merce clause analysis, the Court subjected the challenged program to
many of the balancing considerations employed in traditional dormant
commerce clause analysis. 67
The use of the balancing approach in Alexandria Scrap would have
been precluded under the per se rule68 of City of Philadelphia v. New
62. The Court contrasts the position of non-Maryland processors with "the position of a for-
eign business which enters a State in response to completely private market forces to compete with
domestic businesses, only to find itself burdened with discriminatory taxes or regulations." Id. at
810 n.20.
63. See id. at 809-10. As a result of Maryland's bounty program, the flow of auto hulks resting
within the state "will tend to be processed inside the State rather than flowing to foreign processors.
But no trade barrier of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause, and involved in previous cases,
impedes their movement out of State. They remain within Maryland in response to market forces,
including that exerted by money from the State." Id.
64. Id. at 805-06; cf Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 42 (1980) ("However
important the state interest at hand, 'it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of
commerce coming from outside the State .... '") (quoting City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (commerce clause reflects
"a central concern of the Framers that . . . the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies
toward economic Balkanization"); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1978)
(Court has consistently held invalid state actions "isolating the state from the national economy");
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) ("[O]ne state in its dealings with another
may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.").
65. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 814 (portion of opinion holding that program did not violate
equal protection clause); cf Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 391 (1978)
(upholding state program against privileges and immunities challenge and noting importance of
preservation purposes underlying statutory scheme), discussed infra note 93 and accompanying text.
66. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 817 (Stevens, J., concurring).
67. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 (1981) (state has
legitimate interest in protecting environment); Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S, 27, 43
(1980) (state has legitimate interest in protecting citizens' financial resources from fraud, although
this state interest did not justify burdensomeness of statute in question); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (state has interest in assuring fair financial return to local businesses).
68. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court has found this par-
ticular burden on interstate commerce to be virtually per se illegal) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), discussed supra note 27).
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Jersey.69 Because the program expressly discriminated against out-of-
state commerce, the Court would not have weighed the burden to com-
merce against the statute's local benefits, but instead would have summa-
rily struck down Maryland's scheme.70 Therefore, only by finding that
the state's action was outside the scope of the dormant commerce clause
altogether could the Court have upheld the statute.
Not only did the Court in Alexandria Scrap fail to articulate clearly
whether the market participant test was a threshold inquiry that could
entirely preclude further review, it also left the meaning of the term
"market participation" broad and unclear. Although in form Mary-
land's entry into the marketplace to buy abandoned cars resembled the
actions of a private market force,71 its motive was not typical of a private
entity. It bought cars in order to clean up state highways, 72 a motive
more frequently associated with governmental than with private enter-
prise.73 The Court's preoccupation with form implied that the purpose
of the action might be irrelevant to the test.
2. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake. It took the Court's decision in Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake 74 to remove the market participant test from an ambiguous
setting and establish it as a significant restraint on the scope of the dor-
mant commerce clause. The majority opinion, written by Justice Black-
mun, achieved this in two ways. First, it firmly asserted that the test is a
threshold inquiry that can be dispositive.75 Second, it confirmed the
breadth of the term "market participation" by equating it with any form
of "state proprietary action."'76 The Court's elaboration of the test pro-
69. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
70. See id. at 626-27 ("[W]hatever [a state's] ultimate purpose it may not be accomplished by
discriminating against articles of commerce ....").
71. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 809-10 (commerce is not being disrupted by regulation
but by market forces, including that exerted by Maryland's participation in the market).
72. Id. at 809.
73. Cf Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 465 (1981) (legitimate state
purpose to remove litter from the environment); Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371, 388-91 (1978) (power to protect wildlife and natural resources peculiarly within a state's
police power).
74. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
75. Id. at 436.
76. See id. at 433-34; see also White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S.
204, 208-10 (1983).
Courts have been unable to give "principled content" to the concept of state proprietary action.
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1014 (1985). Usually
courts define it by opposition to state governmental action. See, e.g., id. at 1013; New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946). The Supreme Court has used various criteria for distinguishing
proprietary from governmental state actions: how closely the state action resembles that of a private
trader, see, e.g., Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 369 (1934) (state loses its sovereign character when
it "enters the market place seeking customers"); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 461
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voked a vigorous dissent from Justice Powell, author of the majority
opinion in Alexandria Scrap.
77
In Reeves the Court considered the constitutionality of the policy of
South Dakota's state-owned cement plant, which required the plant to
supply all state customers first and distribute the remaining volume on a
first-come, first-served basis.78 South Dakota implemented the resident
preference in 1978 because of production problems and a nationwide
shortage. 79 The Court concluded that this form of "state proprietary ac-
tivity"80 did not violate the dormant commerce clause because South Da-
kota was merely acting as a market participant.
81
(1905) (contrasting state's conduct of functions having "strictly governmental character" with its
carrying on "an ordinary private business"); Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 318, 323
(1829) (state does not act in sovereign capacity as proprietor of bank); how "essential" the state's
action is to the operations of governance, see Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1012-13 (quoting Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911)); whether the state action is carried on for profit, see, e.g.,
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973) (implying that state
operation ofhospitals and training schools was not proprietary was based in part on fact that activity
was not for profit and in part on fact that states had exclusively operated these institutions for a long
time); and whether the activity is one that has traditionally been carried out by the states, see id.; see
also United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185 (1936).
Indeed, long ago the Court's inability to distinguish proprietary from governmental functions
led it to abandon the distinction for purposes of determining what state actions were exempt from
federal taxation. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946). Last term the Court aban-
doned the distinction for purposes of determining what state actions were protected from federal
legislation under the commerce clause. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S.
Ct. 1005, 1015-16 (1985), discussed infra notes 240, 258 and accompanying text. This note argues
that the distinction is equally unworkable as a basis for limiting the scope of the dormant commerce
clause. See infra note 240.
77. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 447-54 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 432-33. Prior to implementation of the resident preference, the plant had been sup-
plying Reeves, a Wyoming distributor, with 95% of its cement for twenty years. Id. at 432. The
advent of the preference policy forced Reeves to cut its business markedly, and it sought to enjoin
this discriminatory restriction. Id. at 433.
79. Id. at 432-33.
80. Id. at 434.
81. See id at 440, 446. The procedural history of the case is instructive. Petitioner Reeves
sought to enjoin the South Dakota policy of preferring its resident buyers and obtained a permanent
injunction from the district court. Id. at 433. The court of appeals reversed, relying on Alexandria
Scrap. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelly, 586 F.2d 1230, 1232-33 (8th Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded mem.,
441 U.S. 939 (1979). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated judgment, and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). See Reeves, Inc.
v. Kelley, 441 U.S. 939 (1979) (mem.). Hughes used the dormant commerce clause to strike down
an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the shipment of minnows caught in Oklahoma for sale out of state.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979). In doing so, the Court overruled Geer v. Con-
necticut, 161 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1896), which sustained against a commerce clause challenge a statute
forbidding interstate transportation of game birds lawfully killed within the state. Hughes, 441 U.S.
at 325. Hughes rejected the notion that the state, as owner of its game birds, could control them
however it chose. Id. at 329-36. On remand of Reeves, Inc. v. Kelly, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals distinguished Hughes as preventing a state from controlling the interstate movement of
privately owned articles of trade. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelly, 603 F.2d 736, 737-38 (1979), affd sub nom.
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Comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions illustrates the
role of Reeves in entrenching and defining the market participant test.
The majority implicitly established the market participant characteriza-
tion as a threshold determination,82 purporting to rely on the "unmistak-
ably broad terms" 83 of Alexandria Scrap. In contrast, Justice Powell,
dissenting, declared that this initial characterization did not dispense
with further review;84 instead, the Court should also determine whether
the state action impermissibly burdened the flow of interstate com-
merce.85 Powell considered the market participant classification not as
precluding further scrutiny of the challenged state action, but as describ-
ing activity that, because it constituted participation by the state as a
private market force, did not create an impermissible burden.
86
In addition to their disagreement about the conclusiveness in Alex-
andria Scrap of labelling Maryland's activity market participation, the
majority and dissent differed on what sorts of state action should be com-
pletely exempt from commerce clause scrutiny. The majority reasoned
that since "the Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and
regulatory measures, ' 87 the state is exempt when acting in its proprietary
capacity.88 Thus, the majority defines market participation in opposition
to market regulation.8 9 The dissent, on the other hand, would have ex-
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). (Curiously, the Supreme Court in Hughes did not make
the same distinction in overruling Geer that the Eighth Circuit did. Compare Reeves, 603 F.2d at
737-38 with Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36). The Eighth Circuit again relied on Alexandria Scrap, 603
F.2d at 738, and when Reeves reached the Supreme Court for the second time, the Court accepted
this distinction between control of state resources and private articles of commerce. See Reeves, 447
U.S. at 433 n.4.
82. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 451 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting) (maintaining that after its determination in Alexandria Scrap
that Maryland was a market participator, the Court went on to determine that its program did not
impermissibly burden interstate commerce).
86. See id. at 451-52 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell explained:
We further stated [in Alexandria Scrap] "that the novelty of this case is not its presentation
of a new form of 'burden' upon commerce, but that appellee should characterize Mary-
land's action as a burden which the Commerce Clause was intended to make suspect."...
The opinion then emphasized that "no trade barrier of the type forbidden by the Com-
merce Clause. . . impedes th[e] movement [of hulks] out of State.". . . The Court con-
cluded that the subsidies provided under the Maryland program erected no barrier to
trade.
Id. at 452 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 807, 809-10).
87. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37.
88. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
89. The market participation/regulation dichotomy first arose in Alexandria Scrap. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text. Ultimately, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employ-
ers, 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7, 216-22 (1983), the major point of contention between the majority and
dissent became whether or not resident preference in city hiring was regulation. See infra notes 122-
25 and accompanying text.
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cepted only those state actions that constitute an "integral operation in
areas of traditional governmental functions." 90 Nonetheless, it is impor-
tant to an understanding of present dormant commerce clause doctrine
that both the majority and dissent recognized that there is a category of
cases in which state action will be completely immune from commerce
clause attack. Moreover, the majority and dissent agreed that it is the
form of the action rather than its purpose or effect on interstate com-
merce that determines whether the action falls into this category. 91
The majority buttressed its primary assertion, that the commerce
clause does not reach market participation, with three additional sup-
ports. First, it justified the exception on the basis of the need to protect
state sovereignty and the role of each state "as guardian and trustee for
its people."' 92 The paradox of this reasoning, of course, is that precisely
to the extent that the state is acting as guardian of its people, it is acting
like a political entity and not like a private market force. 93 In Reeves, for
example, South Dakota acted like an ordinary market participant until it
took the action giving rise to the suit; cutting off the supply of cement to
long-time out-of-state customers was purely politically motivated.
The majority in Reeves further justified the market participant test
as an addition that takes into account "the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer, engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal."' 94 Considered in conjunction with the Court's concern for the
state's role as guardian of its citizens, this reasoning gives to states the
opportunity to favor their own citizens, for purely political purposes, as
long as the form of their preference resembles that of a private market
90. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985)).
91. Compare Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (characterizing as "basic" the
distinction between market participation and regulation) with id. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting)
("The application of the Commerce Clause . . . should turn on the nature of the governmental
activity involved.").
92. Id. at 438 (quoting Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191 (1915) (upholding against fourteenth
amendment and commerce clause attack a New York City ordinance preferring state citizens in
hiring for public works)).
93. Creating the market participant exception to protect the state's role as guardian is illogical,
not only because that role is inconsistent with the standard of the test-that the state act like a
private entity-but also because a state may act as the guardian of its people by regulating as well as
by participating in the market. Varat, State 'Citizenship'and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI L. REV.
487, 505-07 (1981); see also Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 392 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (Montana's differential licensing fees for resident and nonresident elk
hunters "manifest the State's special interest in regulating and preserving wildlifefor the benefit of its
citizens") (emphasis added), discussed infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
94. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
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force. 95
Finally, the Court justified the market participant test as a simplifi-
cation of traditional dormant commerce clause analysis. Traditional
analysis, the Court asserted, often raised politically charged considera-
tions of judicial control over legislative actions.96 This last justification is
logically flawed. First, the Court will still be faced with the complex and
politically charged issue of Whether the state activity is market participa-
tion or market regulation. 97 Second, in theory those cases excluded from
commerce clause review will most often be the "simple, unilateral refus-
als to deal" with nonresidents, 98 and the more complex regulatory pro-
grams will remain to be analyzed.
In light of the weaknesses of the Court's rationale, three considera-
tions, present also in Alexandria Scrap 99 and resembling traditional bal-
ancing approach considerations, 10 may furnish stronger reasons for
upholding South Dakota's resident preference. 101
First, as in Alexandria Scrap, 102 the Reeves Court confronted the
prospect of discouraging what it considered "effective and creative pro-
grams for solving local problems."' 0 3 In addition to encouragement of
experimentation, a desire to give latitude to a state in distributing and
95. "Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others." Id. at 436 (quoting Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810 (footnote omitted)).
The Reeves Court elaborated on the analogy between a state and a private market force in re-
marking, "[E]venhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, States should similarly share
existing freedoms from federal constraints .... " Reeves, 447 U.S. at 439. This remark obscures
the fact that complaints arise when the state, acting in its propretary capacity, makes a political
choice, for example, favoring its own citizens in the sale or procurement of services. This political
decision transforms whatever "private entity" features it has. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, the proposed modification to present dormant commerce clause analysis, see infra
notes 218-40 and accompanying text, separates consideration of those instances in which a state acts
in its role as guardian of its people from those in which it behaves exactly like a private market force.
96. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436.
97. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 211-13
(1980) (city was expending its own funds to benefit the poor and disadvantaged); cf id. at 218-21
(Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (hiring preference regulates private economic relationships and
violates commerce clause).
98. See id. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (distinguishing Reeves and Alexandria
Scrap as "simple unilateral refusals to deal").
99. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
101. See Varat, supra note 93, at 549.
102. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 814.
103. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441. "[R]eversal ... would rob South Dakota of the intended benefit
of its foresight, risk, and industry [in building the plant]." Id. at 446.
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preserving limited funds underlies the reasoning of both cases. 104 Fi-
nally, as the Reeves Court cogently argues, both Maryland's program for
clearing its roadsides and South Dakota's for supplying residents with
cement demonstrate a clearly permissible goal-to channel state benefits
to the residents who, through taxes and otherwise, create these
benefits: 0
5
We find the label "protectionism" of little help in this context. The
State's refusal to sell to buyers other than South Dakotans is "protec-
tionist" only in the sense that it limits benefits generated by a state
program to those who fund the state treasury and whom the State was
created to serve. Petitioner's argument apparently also would charac-
terize as "protectionist" rules restricting to state residents the enjoy-
ment of state educational institutions, energy generated by a state-run
plant, police and fire protection, and agricultural improvement and
business development programs. Such policies, while perhaps "protec-
tionist" in a loose sense, reflect the essential and patently unobjection-
able purpose of state government-to serve the citizens of the State. '
0 6
As in Alexandria Scrap, because South Dakota's policy expressly
discriminated against out-of-state commerce, rather than burdening in-
terstate and intrastate commerce evenhandedly, a traditional balancing
of burdens and benefits was precluded by the per se rule of City of Phila-
delphia. 10 7 Thus, the Court considered those elements weighed in the
traditional balancing approach to develop a rule removing South Da-
kota's program from the reach of the dormant commerce clause alto-
gether. Reeves also resembled Alexandria Scrap °sO in presenting a
potential privileges and immunities claim that could not be raised be-
cause the plaintiff was a corporation, unprotected by the clause.'0 9
3. White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers.
Although the facts of White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
104. Compare Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 814 (referring to "Maryland's purpose of using its
limited funds to clean up its own environment") with Reeves, 447 U.S. at 441 (referring to state's
innovative approach to problem of distributing government largesse).
105. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442 n.16.
106. Id. at 442.
107. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text. In fact, Justice Brennan had argued in Alex-
andria Scrap that the per se rule, as narrowly articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 145 (1970), discussed supra note 27, should have been applied to the facts of Alexandria Scrap.
See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 821.
108. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 802 (Maryland's program gave an advantage to Maryland
auto processors not available to non-Maryland processors).
109. See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178-82 (1868). The Court in Paul described a
corporation as "the mere creation of local law," id. at 181, and held that corporations lacked privi-
leges and immunities clause protection because of both this limited, ficitious nature and the need for




Employers 010 presented a new context for debate over the market partici-
pant test, many of the same issues discussed in Reeves resurfaced. The
Court in White rejected a dormant commerce clause attack against an
order of the mayor of Boston issued pursuant to the state's affirmative
action program."1 ' The order required that all construction projects
funded in whole or in part by city funds be performed by a work force
consisting of at least fifty percent bona fide residents of the city."12
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, perhaps in response to
the contentions of Justice Powell's dissent in Reeves, reasserted that "in
this kind of case there is 'a single inquiry: whether the challenged pro-
gram constituted direct state participation in the market.' "113 More-
over, White contained a more explicit statement that the participant/
regulator distinction was an absolute threshold inquiry: "[W]hen a state
or local government enters the market as a participant it is not subject to
the restraints of the Commerce Clause."'1 14 Finally, in contrast to Justice
Powell's position in Reeves, which precluded invalidation under the com-
merce clause when the state undertook "integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions,"' 15 the Court implicitly established
the scope of the commerce clause to exclude all state proprietary
actions. 1
6
Even more clearly than Alexandria Scrap and Reeves, White demon-
strates that whether the state is regulating or participating in the market
depends on the form of its activity rather than the intent or effect.
In terms of intent, the Boston executive order lacked any legitimate
local objectives such as those found in Alexandria Scrap
1 7 or Reeves. 118
Instead, it was a classic example of a protectionist measure that "directly
impede[d] free private trade in the national marketplace." ' 19 As such,
110. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
111. See id. at 213 & n. 11 (finding executive order "harmonious" with federal regulations requir-
ing federally funded projects to offer opportunities to poor and minorities).
112. See id. at 206 & n.1. See generally Note, Municipal Employee Residency Requirements and
Equal Protection, 84 YALE L.J. 1684 (1975) (discussing prevalence of residency requirements).
113. White, 460 U.S. at 208 (quoting Reeves, 477 U.S. at 436 n.7). Powell had argued that the
market participant doctrinenecessitated a two-step approach. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 451-52 (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting), discussed supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
114. White, 460 U.S. at 208.
115. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery,
426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985)).
116. See White, 460 U.S. at 208 (appearing to accept state court's equating of market regulation
with "nonproprietary" activity).
117. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
119. White, 460 U.S. at 223 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part); see also supra note 10 (defining
economic protectionism). Although the executive order may have channeled state benefits to those
Vol. 1985:697]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1985:697
the executive order, like the programs in Reeves and Alexandria Scrap,
would have been struck down as per se invalid under the rule of City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey. 120 The fact that the Court perfunctorily up-
held the executive order after labelling it market participation clearly in-
dicates that certain aspects of the traditional balancing approach-
consideration of the commendable purposes of experimentation in the
distribution or preservation of state resources, for example-are irrele-
vant to ,the test.121
In terms of effect, Justice Blackmun, dissenting in part t22 argued
that the resident preference was not simple market participation because
it operated to interfere directly with private contractual relationships be-
tween contractors hired by the city and subcontractors hired by the con-
tractors.123 The attempt to govern private economic relationships-in
this case, whom the contractors could hire as subcontractors-was, Jus-
tice Blackmun argued, the "essence of regulation."' 124 Nonetheless, Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, strongly implied that the effect
of the state's activity on private economic relations was of little or no
importance in determining market participation. 25
who, through taxes and otherwise, created those benefits, see Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442 & n. 16, the
distinction between a state's power "to shelter its people from menaces to their health or safety and
from fraud, even when those dangers emanate from interstate commerce, and its power to retard,
burden or constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted in
. . . our law," H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
120. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
121. The majority in White did not attempt to justify the aims of the executive order, labeling it
"parochial favoritism," White, 460 U.S. at 213. Instead, it asserted that the question whether the
order had a "significant impact on those firms which. . . employ permanent works crews composed
of out-of-State residents" was irrelevant to analysis under the market participant test. Id. at 209
(citation omitted). Compare Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978), an earlier privileges and
immunities case in which the Court found "at least dubious" the notion that a state could permissi-
bly attempt to alleviate its unemployment problem by requiring private employers to prefer state
residents.
122. White, 460 U.S. at 215-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
123. See id. at 217-23 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 219; see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 433 n.4 (accepting lower court's distinction between
the facts of Reeves and state programs impermissible because they controlled the interstate move-
ment of privately-owned articles of trade); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 599-600
(1923) (state cannot prohibit private parties who own a natural commodity from trading it in inter-
state commerce).
125. White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
We agree with Justice Blackmun that there are some limits on a state or local government's
ability to impose restrictions that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the gov-
ernment transacts business. . . . We find it unnecessary in this case to define those limits
with precision, except to say that we think the Commerce Clause does not require the city
to stop at the boundary of formal privity of contract.
Id.
In South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984), a plurality of the
Court retreated from the position espoused by Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 2245 ("That privity of
contract is not always the outer boundary of permissible state activity does not necessarily mean that
MARKET PARTICIPANT TEST
Unlike the Alexandria Scrap Corporation, the plaintiffs in White
could have made a privileges and immunities clause argument but ch6se
not to do so,' 26 leaving that issue for resolution in United Building &
Constructions Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden. 1
27
Thus, the market participant test, developed in Alexandria Scrap
and Reeves to sustain programs not conceived to impede the flow of in-
terstate commerce, enabled the program in White, which was expressly
intended to deny to nonresidents of the city access to the job market, to
survive as well.' 28 The Court's insistence on examining the form of the
state action to the exclusion of considering its intent or effect created an
anomaly. As a result, under current analysis, a state behaving like a pri-
vate entity can achieve protectionist objectives, which traditionally have
been considered repugnant to the dormant commerce clause.
4. South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke.
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 129 like White, pro-
vided the Court with an opportunity to apply the market participant doc-
trine to a purely protectionist state action. 30 Unlike the situation
presented by White, the situation in South-Central Timber is familiar in
dormant commerce clause analysis: a state's attempt to restrict the ex-
the Commerce Clause has no application within the boundary of formal privity."). The plurality
held that the market participation doctrine does not enable the state to escape commerce clause
scrutiny when the restriction it is imposing affects private economic relationships outside of the
market in which the state is participating. Id. at 2246-47. In doing so, the plurality disagreed with
Justice Rehnquist, who dissented in South-Central Timber and who, according to the plurality,
"would validate under the Commerce Clause any contractual condition that the State had the eco-
nomic power to impose, without regard to the relationship of the subject matter of the contract and
the condition imposed." Id. at 2246 n.10.
126. White, 460 U.S. at 214 n.12.
127. 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1025 n.7 (1984), discussed infra notes 173-200 and accompanying text.
128. In contrast to Alexandria Scrap, see supra note 57 and accompanying text, the White deci-
sion did not consider whether resident preference in hiring violated the equal protection clause. If
such a claim had been made, however, it would not have fared any better than the equal protection
challenge in Alexandria Scrap. Because the right to work for the government is not fundamental for
purposes of equal protection, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976) (per curiam) (Court has never recognized that right of governmental employment per se is
fundamental for equal protection purposes), the Court would have applied only minimal scrutiny
and concluded that discrimination against non-residents of the city was rationally related to the
city's goal of lowering municipal unemployment. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 177, 191, 194
(1915) (labor law preferring New York citizens over citizens of other states in hiring for public
works did not violate fourteenth amendment equal protection clause); cf McCarthy v. Philadelphia
Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646 (1976) (per curiam) (residency requirement for fire depart-
ment employees did not violate constitutionally protected right to travel).
129. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
130. See supra note 10 (defining protectionism); cf South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2239
(purpose of statute was to protect state timber processors).
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port of its natural resources for the benefit of its citizens. 131 Long before
the advent of the market participant doctrine, the Court had routinely
and summarily struck down this sort of restriction; 132 these decisions
formed the mainstream of dormant commerce clause doctrine.1 33 The
confluence of this long line of cases invalidating state restrictions on nat-
ural resources and the shorter line of cases developing the market partici-
pant test leaves dormant commerce clause doctrine unsettled and in need
of revision.
In South-Central Timber the Court reviewed an Alaska statute that
required in-state processing of timber from state lands.134 Alaska admit-
ted that it enacted the law to protect existing state processors and en-
courage the establishment of new ones.' 35 In response to a commerce
clause challenge by an out-of-state processor, the state made two argu-
ments. First, Alaska asserted that Congress had implicitly authorized
Alaska to require in-state processing, and so freed it from the constraints
of the dormant commerce clause.1 36 Second, Alaska characterized its
action as market participation rather than market regulation. 1 37 Accord-
ing to the state, it was acting like a private trader in choosing the terms
on which it was willing to sell its timber; as a market participant, it had a
right to sell only to those who promised to process the timber inside the
state. 38 To buttress its second argument, Alaska pointed out that it
could have achieved the same ends by restricting sale to in-state proces-
sors, clearly permissible under White and Reeves, or by furnishing local
131. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 329-35 (1979) (discussing history of Court's
invalidation of statutes preventing export of natural resources); Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc,, 431
U.S. 265, 269, 284-87 (1977) (striking down Virginia statute forbidding fishing by non-residents);
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403-07 (1948) (invalidating statute requiring shrimp caught in
coastal waters off South Carolina to be unloaded and packaged within the state); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1928) (striking down statute requiring in-state processing
of shrimp); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 595-600 (1923) (striking down state statute
limiting export of natural gas); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1911) (same).
132. See supra note 131.
133. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (striking down Arizona statute
requiring that Arizona cantaloupes be packed within the state, and noting that "the Court has
viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the
home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere").
134. South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2239 & n.2.
135. Id. at 2239 (quoting Governor's policy statement).
136. Id. at 2238, 2240-43. To support its argument that Congress implicitly authorized the state
to restrict out-of-state processing of state timber, Alaska cited a handful of federal statutes and
regulations that, both sides agreed, demonstrated a federal policy to restrict out-of-state shipment of
unprocessed Alaska timber from federal lands. Id. at 2241. The parties disagreed whether this
federal policy concerning timber on federal lands implied approval of a parallel state policy gov-
erning state timber. Id.
137. Id. at 2240, 2243-47.
138. Id. at 2245.
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processors with a direct subsidy, an option approved in Alexandria
Scrap.1
39
In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court held that Alaska's statute
violated the commerce clause. 140 The Court had little difficulty rejecting
Alaska's first argument; six of the eight participating Justices agreed that
Congress had not implicitly authorized Alaska's action. 141 In contrast,
Alaska's second argument sharply divided the Court. A plurality of four
decided that Alaska was not merely a market participant;142 Justices
Powell and Burger voted to remand on this issue; 143 Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor dissented. 144
The plurality concluded that Alaska was not simply acting like a
private seller of timber, because the statute forced whoever bought from
the state to deal only with in-state processors. 145 Thus, the state's action
affected more than just those with whom the state dealt directly; it had
"downstream" effects on private contractual arrangements:
[I]t is clear that the State is more than merely a seller of timber. In the
commercial context, the seller usually has no say over, and no interest
in, how the product is to be used after sale; in this case, however, pay-
ment for the timber does not end the obligations of the purchaser, for
despite the fact that the purchaser has taken delivery of the timber and
has paid for it, he cannot do with it as he pleases. Instead, he is obli-
gated to deal with a stranger to the contract after completion of the
sale. 146
The plurality reaffirmed the principle announced in White that permissi-
ble market participation might affect economic entities beyond those
with whom the state dealt (or chose not to deal) directly. 147 Nonetheless,
139. Id. at 2244-45; see also id. at 2248-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The plurality does not
clearly state whether a direct subsidy or a policy restricting sale of state timber to in-state processors
would evade commerce clause scrutiny. See id. at 2243-45 (distinguishing Alexandria Scrap and
Reeves). It rejects the contention that the means of restriction challenged are permissible because
other permissible means could have been used to achieve the same end. Id. at 2246.
140. Id. at 2247.
141. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court rejecting Alaska's first argument; Justices.
Blackmun and Stevens joined in this opinion. Id. at 2238. Justices Powell, Burger and Brennan
concurred. Id. at 2247-48. Justice Marshall did not participate. Id. at 2247. Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. Id. at 2248-49.
142. Id. at 2238, 2243-47. This plurality was composed of Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun
and Stevens.
143. Id. at 2248.
144. Id. at 2248-49.
145. See id. at 2244 (distinguishing Alexandria Scrap on the ground that Alaska "imposes condi-
tions downstream"); id. (describing as "crucial" to White the fact that those affected by the hiring
preference were working for the city); id. at 2245 (distinguishing Reeves in part on the ground that
South Dakota restricted sale, not resale, of cement to out-of-state purchasers); id. at 2246 (statute
"restricts the post-purchase activity of the purchaser rather than merely the purchasing activity").
146. Id. at 2245.
147. Id. ("privity of contract is not always the outer boundary of permissible state activity").
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a state's entry into the market could permissibly influence only a "dis-
crete, identifiable class of economic activity in which [the State] is a ma-
jor participant."1 48 Alaska's measure, in the opinion of the plurality,
exceeded these bounds. The statute not only affected the market in
which Alaska participated, the timber-selling market, it also affected a
market in which Alaska was not participating, the timber-processing
market. 149
The dissent cogently demonstrates that the plurality's narrow defini-
tion of the "market" in which Alaska participated and the plurality's
distinction between restrictions on sale and on resale find little support in
the majority opinions of other market participant cases. i50 These prior
cases established that the only relevant distinction for purposes of the
market participant test is between market participation and regulation.15 1
The plurality seemed to concede that Alaska was participating in the
timber market.' 52 Before South-Central Timber, as the dissent argued,
this determination would have ended the inquiry and exempted the chal-
lenged state action from further commerce clause scrutiny.15 3 Thus, one
148. Id. (quoting White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211
n.7 (1983)).
149. Id. at 2246-47.
150. Id. at 2248 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
151. See White, 460 U.S. at 208 ("As we said in Reeves, in this kind of case there is 'a single
inquiry: Whether the challenged program constituted direct state participation in the market.' ")
(quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980)); see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1028 (1984) (result in White "turned on" the distinc-
tion between market participation and regulation). Reeves devoted none of its analysis to defining
the market in which South Dakota participated; see, 447 U.S. at 436 n.7; instead, it focused on
whether South Dakota's resident preference was regulation or participation. See supra note 74-109
and accompanying text. Likewise, the White Court found irrelevant the impact of Boston's hiring
preference on private contractual relationships that appeared to be outside of the public projects
market in which Boston and Massachusetts participated. See White, 460 U.S. at 209-10 & n.6.
152. South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2244 ("Alaska. . .participates in the timber market,
but imposes conditions downstream in the timber-processing market.").
153. Id. at 2248-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2246 n.10 (majority asserting that
dissent would validate under commerce clause any contractual condition that the state imposed
regardless of its effect on private relationships); supra note 151.
Previous market participant cases addressed the issue of "downstream" effects of market partic-
ipation and found such effects irrelevant. For example, the majority in White acknowledged that the
city's hiring preference affected the private relationships between contractors working for the city
and their employees. 460 U.S. at 209-10 & n.6. It deemed this effect "not relevant to the inquiry of
whether the city is participating in the marketplace." Id. at 209-10. But cf id. at 211 n.7 (conceding
"there are some limits on a state or local government's ability to impose restrictions that reach
beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts business"). Indeed, the South-
Central Timber plurality's emphasis on the downstream effects of market participation represents the
partial ascendance of the position taken by the dissent in White:
The city has not attempted merely to choose 'the parties with whom [it] will deal'. Instead,
it has imposed as a condition of obtaining a public construction contract the requirement
that private firms hire only Boston residents for 50% of specified jobs. Thus, the order
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may infer that a plurality narrowly defined the term "market" for pur-
poses of market participant analysis because four justices feared that "the
[market participant] doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule
that States may not impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce
even if they act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local
industry."15
4
Thus, the plurality apparently recognized that simply by acting in
the form of a market participant, a state can, with the same intent,
achieve the same effect as protectionist regulation that would be summa-
rily invalidated under the per se rule of invalidity.1 55 In an effort to pre-
vent the market participant test from rendering the dormant commerce
clause impotent, the South-Central Timber plurality requires a two-step
analysis. First, the court must determine whether the state is acting in a
proprietary capacity by merely imposing restrictions in the sale or
purchase of goods or services.' 56 Second, it must decide whether any
burden on commerce that results from the state action is limited to the
market in which the state is participating.1 57 The second step, in turn,
requires determination of the existence and extent of a burden on com-
merce and the boundaries of the market in which the state is
participating.
directly restricts the ability of private employers to hire nonresidents, and thereby curtails
nonresidents' access to jobs with private employers.
460 U.S. at 217 (Blackmun, J., joined by White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original); see also id. at
220 (labelling the hiring preference an "[aittempt[ ] directly to constrict private economic choices
through contractual conditions"). With this language and reasoning by Justices Blackmun and
White in their White dissent, compare language from the plurality opinion in South-Central Timber,
authored by Justice White, with whom, among others, Justice Blackmun joined: "Instead of merely
choosing its own trading partners, the State is attempting to govern the private, separate economic
relationships of its trading partners .. " 104 S. Ct. at 2246. Likewise, the majority in Alexandria
Scrap minimized the significance of the effect that Maryland's market participation had on the whole
chain of commerce while the dissent, in which Justice White joined, found this effect quite impor-
tant. Compare Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 796, 803, 809-10 with id. at 824-26, 824
n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
154. South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
155. Id.
It appears that Justice White has always recognized the market participant test's potentially
destructive effect on dormant commerce clause analysis. He is the only Justice who has never voted
to exempt state action from commerce clause scrutiny on the basis of the market participant test. In
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 8 17-32, he joined with Justices Brennan and Marshall in dissent. In
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 447-54, he dissented along with Justices Powell, Brennan and Stevens. In White,
460 U.S. at 215-25, he and Justice Blackmun dissented from that part of the majority opinion that
applied the market participant test. In South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2243-47, Justice White
was joined in his refusal to exempt Alaska's statute as market participation by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun and Stevens.
156. South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
157. See id.
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South-Central Timber's reformulation of the market participant test
complicates the present state of dormant commerce clause analysis with-
out improving it. It complicates analysis by leaving three issues un-
resolved. First, it leaves uncertain what distinguishes market
participation from market regulation.15 8 Second, it does not supply crite-
ria for defining the relevant market. t 59 Third, it does not address
whether a state acting as a market participant may affect commerce
outside the market in which it participates as long as this burden on com-
merce is slight compared to the local benefit.160 South-Central Timber's
modification does not improve the state of dormant commerce clause
analysis because it still permits a state to further classically protectionist
goals by acting in the form of a market participant. 161 In this case, for
example, rather than requiring whoever bought timber to process it in-
side the state, Alaska might have validly restricted sale of its timber to in-
state processors.
162
II. EXTENSION OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF
ARTICLE FOUR TO MUNICIPAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS
If the market participant test had not placed the programs in Alex-
andria Scrap, Reeves and White beyond the reach of the dormant com-
merce clause, they would have been summarily struck down under the
per se rule of City Philadelphia v. New Jersey.163 Programs that advance
158. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text (discussing lack of precedent for plurality
holding).
159. See id. at 2246.
160. On one hand, the Court recognizes that market participation may have an effect on eco-
nomic relationships in addition to those to which the state is a party. See supra note 147 and accom-
panying text. On the other, once the state's participation has an effect beyond its "market," it may
be summarily invalidated under the per se rule of invalidity. See South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at
2247.
161. See supra note 131 (collecting cases striking down classically protectionist statutes); see also
supra note 34 (same).
162. The Court is equivocal about whether Alaska could permissibly have restricted sale of its
timber to in-state processors. See South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2245; see also supra note 139.
Nonetheless, it would be difficult to distinguish such a preference from those upheld in White and
Reeves. See generally supra notes 74-128 and accompanying text.
163. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Under the per se rule of City of Philadelphia, a state may not accom-
plish legitimate local objectives by discriminating against articles in interstate commerce. City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. The Court in Alexandria Scrap admitted that Maryland's program
decreased the flow ofiunked cars out of Maryland to out-of-state processors, 426 U.S. at 809, and so
favored Maryland residents over non-Maryland residents, id. at 810. Indeed, the dissent in Alexan-
dria Scrap argued that this intentional burden on commerce constituted protectionism, which the
Court had traditionally found impermissible. Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, South
Dakota implemented its policy of supplying cement to state citizens first and allocating the rest on a
first-come, first-served basis specifically to reduce the flow of cemeAt out of state and preserve sup-
plies for its citizens. See Reeves; 447 U.S. at 432-33 (resident preference forced out-of-state cement
distributor to cut its production by 76%). Finally, the parties in White stipulated that as a result of
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legitimate local goals will be summarily struck down if they discriminate
against interstate commerce. 64
Given the Supreme Court's awareness that the challenged state pro-
grams in Alexandria Scrap, Reeves and White could not have survived
under the per se rule of City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 165 one may
suppose that the Court developed the market participant test in an effort
to protect desirable state programs from the inflexible operation of that
rule. 166 Regardless of the Court's intent, however, while the market par-
ticipant exception protects programs which arguably do not implement
economic protectionism-South Dakota's cement plant, for exam-
ple167-it also allows measures such as the hiring preference in White168
to evade commerce clause scrutiny.
In United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Cam-
den, 169 the Supreme Court extended the privileges and immunities clause
to reach the sort of protectionism left intact in White. While the exten-
sion of the clause was logical,170 limitations in privileges and immunities
clause doctrine remain that prevent its application to all protectionist
measures that take the form of market participation. 171 To reach all such
actions, modifications in current dormant commerce clause analysis must
be made. 1
72
Boston's hiring preference, out-of-state workers who would otherwise have been employed in the
state would be unemployed, and out-of-state contractors would be discouraged from bidding on
public construction. 460 U.S. at 209 n.6. In short, in all three cases the state sought to accomplish
its goal by discriminating against out-of-state commerce, a practice explicitly proscribed in City of
Philadelphia.
164. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 37 (1980) (the practical operation of a state
action, in addition to its purpose, may bring it within the per se rule); see also supra notes 24-40
(discussing per se rule of invalidity).
165. See White, 460 U.S. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that the resident
preference is subject to the per se rule); Reeves, 447 U.S. at 433 n.4 (distinguishing per se rule of City
of Philadelphia from the case before it on grounds that per se rule applied only to prevention of flow
of commerce in privately owned articles of trade); Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (even where state is pursuing a clearly legitimate goal, statutes neutralizing competition
from other states are virtually per se illegal).
166. Although the first complete articulation of the per se rule of invalidity in City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey occurred about two years after the first market participant case-Alexandra
Scrap-the per se rule originated before City of Philadelphia. First mention of the per se rule oc-
curred in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970), and a specific reference to the rule
appeared in Alexandria Scrap. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 821 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 27.
167. See supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
169. 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984), rev'g 88 N.J. 317, 443 A.2d 148 (1982).
170. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 201-17 and accompanying text.
172. See infra notes 218-40 and accompanying text.
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
A. United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden.
In United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Cam-
den, 173 the Supreme Court reached an issue left unresolved in White :174
whether a city measure that preferred city residents in hiring violated the
privileges and immunities clause.175 Enacted pursuant to New Jersey's
statewide affirmative action program, 7 6 the Camden ordinance at issue
required that at least forty percent of the employees of contractors and
subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden resi-
dents.' 77 The Court concluded that the ordinance constituted at least a
prima facie violation of the privileges and immunities clause, and re-
manded the case for a determination of whether the city could provide
adequate justification for the discriminatory nature of the ordinance.
178
Under privileges and immunities clause doctrine, the state can justify dis-
crimination against nonresidents only with a two-part showing: that a
"substantial reason" justifies differential treatment of residents and non-
residents, and that the challenged discrimination bears a "close relation"
to legitimate state objectives.
179
In order to reach the state action challenged in United Building, the
Court construed the privileges and immunities clause to prohibit discrim-
ination based on municipal residency.' 80 Previously the clause had only
been used to invalidate discrimination based on state residency.' 8 ' Little
173. 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
174. Id. at 1025 n.7 (explaining that the issue was left open in White, 460 U.S. at 214 n.12,
because the court below did not reach the issue).
175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
176. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-31 to 38 (West 1976 & Supp. 1985-86).
177. CAMDEN, N.J. ORDINANCE MC §§ C(IV)(b), VIII (1984).
178. United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1029.
179. Id. at 1029; see also Supreme Court v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1280-81 (1985). The Court in
United Building noted that there was a particular need for remand in this case because of its proce-
dural posture. United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1030, The ordinance was approved following only
brief administrative hearings before the Chief Affirmative Action Officer of the New Jersey Treasury
Department in 1980. United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317,
325, 443 A.2d 148, 151 (1982), rev'd and remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984). The appellant associa-
tion filed notice of appeal with the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, and the
New Jersey Supreme Court certified the appeal directly to the state supreme court level from the
state agency. Id. A recent case following United Building found that remand was not warranted
when the state had an opportunity in proceedings below to offer facts justifying the state's preferen-
tial hiring statute but failed to do so. W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 498 (7th Cir.
1984) (affirming district court's invalidation of Illinois's hiring preference law as violative of the
privileges and immunities clause).
180. United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1029-30.
181. See, eg., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (article IV, section 2 "was designed to
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State
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case law or constitutional history supported this extension, as Justice
Blackmun, the lone dissenter, demonstrated.1
82
The majority justified its extension in three ways. First, case law
suggested that the privileges and immunities clause should be given a
flexible reading.1 83 Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, that this
flexibility traditionally has been used to limit, not extend, the reach of the
clause.18 4 Second, the majority argued that the extension was consistent
with Mullaney v. Anderson, 185 in which the clause was used to strike
down a statute that discriminated between residents and nonresidents of
a territory. To this, Justice Blackmun countered that Mullaney's holding
depended on the construction of a federal statute, not on the Constitu-
tion. t86 Third, the majority drew an analogy to equal protection and
commerce clause decisions in which, respectively, freedom of mobility
and the free flow of commerce intrastate were afforded the same constitu-
tional protection as those freedoms exercised interstate. 18 7 Justice Black-
mun criticized the majority's analogy on the ground that the history
surrounding the adoption of the clause did not justify its extension.' 88
The history of the privileges and immunities clause undermines
rather than supports the extension that occurred in United Building.
189
B enjoy") (emphasis added); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) ("the privileges and
immunities secured to citizens of each State in the several States, . . . are those . . . which are
common to the citizens in the latter States under their constitution and laws by virtue of their being
citizens') (emphasis added).
182. United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1031-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1029 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
184. Id. at 1036. The Court in Toomer did not specifically describe the clause as flexible; instead,
it said that the clause did not absolutely bar differential treatment of citizens and noncitizens of a
state "where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it." 334 U.S. at 396. Other Supreme
Court decisions have similarly stressed this qualification to the absolute language of the clause,
which guarantees equality in "all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," U.S.
CONST. art. IV., § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). See, e.g., Supreme Court v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272,
1280-81 (1985) (court rule that restricted bar admission to state resident violated privileges and
immunities clause); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 533-34 (1978) (Alaska preferential hiring stat-
ute violated privileges and immunities clause).
185. 342 U.S. 415 (1952). The Mullaney Court did not consider whether the privileges and
immunities clause would apply to a Territory in the absence of a congressional statute. Id. at 419-20
(Congress made the privileges and immunities clause applicable to the Territory of Alaska by
statute).
186. United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1036.
187. See id. at 1026-27.
188. Id. at 1031-34.
189. The history surrounding the adoption of the privileges and immunities clause is sparse.
Simson, Discrimination against Nonresidents and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
128 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 383 (1979); see generally R. HOWELL, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
OF STATE CITIZENSHIP 9-33 (1918) (outlining the history of the adoption of the clause); Antieau,
Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 2-10 (1967) (same).
The clause is derived from the fourth article of the Articles of Confederation:
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At the time the clause was adopted, discrimination on the basis of munic-
ipal residency was rarely practiced; what little there was presented a dan-
ger insufficient to warrant including such discrimination within the ambit
of the privileges and immunities clause. 190 Instead, the framers designed
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of
the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these states. . . shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people
of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, imposi-
tions and restrictions as the inhabitants thereof respectively.
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660 (1975) (quoting ART. CONFED. art. IV).
The author of the clause, Charles Pinckney, presented it to the Constitutional Convention as
"founded exactly upon the principles of the 4th article," Austin, 420 U.S. at 661 n.6 (citing 3 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 112 (1911); see also Austin,
420 U.S. at 660-61 (framers intended no change of substance or intent from the fourth article). The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention adopted the privileges and immunities clause almost
without debate. See 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1786-1870 at 456, 634 (1965). The framers clearly were concerned about protectionist
measures enacted by states, as is evident in James Madison's query to William Paterson of New
Jersey concerning his proposal for the Union: "Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other?
Of these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virga. & Maryland which give a
preference to their own citizens in cases where the Citizens [of other states] are entitled to equality of
privileges by the Articles of Confederation." Austin, 420 U.S. at 661 n.5 (citing 1 M. FARRAND,
supra, at 317) (brackets in original).
Consistent with the history of the adoption of the privileges and immunities clause, the Supreme
Court has construed the clause to prevent discord between states. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana
Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 382 (1978) (quoting Austin, 420 U.S. at 660) (the clause
"establishes a norm of comity"). Thus, neither constitutional history nor case law supports the
notion that the privileges and immunities clause was meant to apply to discrimination on the basis of
municipal residency.
Nonetheless, one may argue that retaliation among states is just as likely to occur in response to
a state's enactment or toleration of legislation discriminating on the basis of municipal residency as
in response to a state's enactment of statutes preferring state residents. For example, Maryland, in an
apparently retaliatory mood, has enacted a statute which allows contractors or subcontractors on
public works to "refuse to employ workmen who are residents of any state which. . . enforces laws
that prohibit Maryland residents from employment as workmen on public works in that state," MD.
ANN. CODE art. 21, § 8-503(a) (1981). This statute applies, on its face, whether a Maryland resident
is discriminated against as a non-state or a non-municipal resident.
190. See generally E. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT 126-44 (1938).
In the seventeenth century, residents of towns and cities depended on the municipal corporation and
other local government devices to regulate the price and quality of goods. Id. at 126-27. This self-
containment and large degree of regulation was even more prevalent in America than in England
because of greater distances and communication difficulties between settlements. Id. Thus, groups
of merchants and tradesmen, and consumers as well, viewed local governmental control as a weapon
against foreigners. Id. at 129. Nonetheless, with growing populist sentiment and increased mobility,
ordinances restricting the activity of foreign traders began to fade as early as 1715, and by the time of
the American Revolution had become nearly extinct:
By 1775 this all-inclusive concept of the municipality had yielded to the force of circum-
stance; and only the hollow shell of limited trade regulation remained. The local monopo-
lies were largely passing. . . ; the regulation of price and quality alone gave signs of real
vitality, even though confining itself to obviously glaring abuses; its detailed and intimate
quality had been relegated to the limbo of a former age.
Id. at 160-61.
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the clause to guarantee that the rights secured to nonresidents of a state
be the same as those given to its residents. 191 The Court has explained
that the need for this constitutional guarantee was based on the belief
that discrimination favoring state residents was unlikely to be challenged
in the state legislatures, and that nonresidents' rights to equal treatment
should not have to depend on the "uncertain remedies afforded by diplo-
matic processes and official retaliation." 192 Applying this reasoning to
municipal residency preferences, one may argue that residents of the
state who are nonresidents of the favored city can exert pressure through
their vote to check such favoritism, since the discrimination on the basis
of municipal residency can only exist with the state's approval. 193 Thus,
this historical rationale for the privileges and immunities clause does not
support extending it to municipal residency preferences.
1 94
The lack of a historical or precedential basis for the extension in
United Building leads one to wonder why it occurred. Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, argued that excepting from the reach of the
clause "all classifications that are less than statewide would provide the
States with a simple means of evading the strictures of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause."' 95 He cited as an example a state enactment of a
resident preference for all its citizens in the northern half of the state and
another, separate preference for all its citizens in the southern half.
196
Pursuing Justice Rehnquist's reasoning, one can argue that such a geo-
graphical preference-in hiring forstate construction projects, for exam-
ple-would not only evade the privileges and immunities clause, it would
also, subsequent to White, 197 survive commerce clause attack, 98 equal
191. "The primary purpose of this clause. .. was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of
independent, sovereign States. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into
State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385,
395 (1948); see also infra note 209.
192. Toomer, 374 U.S. at 395.
193. See City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (municipality derives its au-
thority from the state).
194. But see United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1027 (arguing that nonresidents are as powerless to
use state political processes against a municipal-residency preference as they are against a state-
residency preference).
195. See United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1027 n.9. Justice Rehnquist's common-sense reasoning
may reflect an awareness of the prevalence of resident hiring preference statutes imposed on private
contractors. At least twenty-three states had such provisions in 1982. Note, Construction Worker
Residency Requirements: A Constitutional Response, 17 NEw ENG. L. REV. 461, 461 n.3 (1982).
196. See United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1027 n.9.
197. See supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
198. White reaffirmed the principle that when a state or local government "enters the market as
a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause." 460 U.S. at 208. Thus, it is
not necessary that market participation prefer state residents over non-residents. The broad terms of
White permit state and local governments to do business with whomever they choose as long as they
are merely expending their own funds in entering the marketplace. Id. at 214-15.
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protection clause scrutiny, 199 and analysis under the constitutionally pro-
tected right to travel.
2°°
B. Limitations on the Use of the Privileges and Immunities Clause to
Prohibit Economic Protectionism.
Although the privileges and immunities clause operated in United
Building to allow review of a form of economic protectionism that
evaded commerce clause scrutiny, the privileges and immunities clause in
its present form will not reach all such instances. Because of the funda-
mentally different concerns of the privileges and immunities and com-
merce clauses, and the entrenched limitations on whom the clause
protects and on what privileges it protects, privileges and immunities
analysis has limited uses in invalidating protectionism.
Perhaps most significantly, privileges and immunities doctrine limits
the class which can claim its protection in two ways. First, the guarantee
of equal treatment to citizens and noncitizens does not extend to corpora-
tions.20 1 This limitation precluded a privileges and immunities challenge
to the discrimination in Alexandria Scrap 202 and Reeves.2 0 3 Second, only
nonresidents of a state may challenge that state's discriminatory prac-
tices.204 This second limitation barred a privileges and immunities chal-
lenge by some of the plaintiffs in both City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey 205 and Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery.20 6 Recent Supreme
199. See Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 190-93 (1915) (New York City labor ordinance prefer-
ring state residents in hiring for public works did not violate fourteenth amendment); cf Massachu-
setts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (Court has never recognized a right of
governmental employment per se as fundamental for equal protection purposes).
200. McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646 (1976) (per curiam) (resi-
dency requirement for fire department employees did not violate constitutionally protected right to
travel).
201. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 181 (1868) ("The Corporation being the
mere creation of local law, can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where
created. . . . The recognition of its existence even by other States. . . depend[s] purely upon the
comity of those states .... ).
202. The party challenging Maryland's program was a Virginia corporation. Alexandria Scrap,
426 U.S. at 799.
203. Petitioner in Reeves was a Wyoming corporation. 447 U.S. at 432.
204. E.g., United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1027; Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138
(1873); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872). Although the text of the
clause appears to prohibit discrimination between state citizens and noncitizens, not between state
residents and nonresidents, the Court has found that for purposes of privileges and immunities
clause analysis, the terms "resident" and "citizen" are essentially interchangeable. See Austin v.
New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662, 662 n.8 (1975).
205. State residents were among the plaintiffs challenging the statute. City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978).
206. Minnesota dairies and plastic bottle producers joined in the action to overturn the Minne-
sota law. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 458 n.l (1981).
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Court decisions have reaffirmed without comment these long-standing
restraints on the scope of the clause.
20 7
Moreover, the privileges and immunities clause prohibits only dis-
crimination with respect to "fundamental" privileges. 20 8 "Only with re-
spect to those 'privileges' and 'immunities' bearing upon the vitality of
the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and
nonresident, equally. ' 20 9 Although the hiring preference in United
207. See, e.g., United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1027 (reasserting the limitation as to nonresidents);
Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 656 (1981) (corporation unable
to challenge discriminatory tax under privileges and immunities clause).
208. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 386-87 (1978). One of the
major points of dispute in Baldwin was whether this threshold requirement of fundamentality was
directly traceable to the "natural rights" threshold first articulated in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas.
546, 551-52 (E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), see Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 395-98 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting), or whether this test had been abandoned by the Court
in later decisions such as Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), and Mullaney v. Anderson, 342
U.S. 415 (1952). See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 397-402 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). The Court applied
this standard to a Montana licensing scheme for elk hunting. See id. at 388. The discrimination
took two forms. First, the nonresident who wished to hunt only elk had to buy a combination
license for hunting other types of game; the resident wishing to hunt only elk could buy a single-
purpose license. See id. at 373. Second, the combination license cost nonresidents $225; the same
hunting privileges cost residents only $30. See id. at 373-74. The Court characterized the privilege
to hunt elk as a recreation and a sport that is "costly and obviously available only to the wealthy
nonresident.. . . It is not a means to the nonresident's livelihood." Id. at 388. Indeed, the Court
has concluded that the privileges and immunities clause is primarily concerned with protecting the
right to pursue a livelihood. See United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1028 ("Many, if not most, of our
cases expounding the Privileges and Immunities Clause have dealt with this basic and essential
activity.").
The Court has recognized other privileges in addition to those first identified in Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1823). Corfield described the "natural rights" protected by the
clause to include:
[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state, for
purpose of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the
writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the
state; [and] to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal. ...
Id. at 552. After Corfield, Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975), established that
nonresidents could not be charged taxes from which residents were free. Prior to Austin, Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973), established that nonresidents could not be discriminated against in
access to medical services, and Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 258-59 (1898), used the clause to
give equal rights in state courts to nonresident creditors.
In his dissent in Baldwin, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and Marshall, cogently
argued that the natural rights doctrine articulated in Corfield embodied an attempt to vest in each
citizen a set of rights that would be federally protected and remain the same wherever the citizen
travelled. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 396-97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This attempt to supply an
absolutist definition for privileges and immunities gave way to a more comparative approach in Paul
v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869):
It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each state
upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from
citizenship in those states was concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alienage
in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them by other States; it gives
them the right of free ingress into other States and egress from them; it insures to them in
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Building was found to involve a fundamental privilege,210 the status of
other forms of market participation that discriminate against interstate
commerce and nonresidents remains unclear.
211
other States the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the acquisition
and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happiness; and it secures to them in other
states the equal protection of their laws. It has justly been said that no provision of the
Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one peo-
ple as this.
Thus, Brennan argued, Paul found that the privileges and immunities clause guaranteed that
"the measure of the rights secured to nonresidents was the extent of the rights afforded by a State to
its own citizens." Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 397 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing Paul, 75 U.S. at
180). Cases that followed Paul and preceded Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), misread Paul.
See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 397 (Brennan, J., dissenting). These intervening cases, Justice Brennan
maintained, did not recognize that Paul's approach was meant to supersede Corfield's, but instead
believed Paul was meant to supplement the "natural rights" approach of Corfield. See Baldwin, 436
U.S. at 397 (Brennan, J., dissenting). And so, before deciding whether the state was discriminating
impermissibly, the Court in these cases decided whether or not the asserted privilege was within
those described by Justice Washington in Corfield as natural rights. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 397
(Brennan, J., dissenting). According to Brennan, Toomer v. Witsell established the modern view of
the clause, as one "designed to ensure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy." See id. at 399 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395). After Toomer, Justice Brennan concluded, the Court's principal concern,
and correctly so, was with the discrimination itself, and whether there was a legitimate reason for it.
See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 401-02 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1028-29 (noting that many, if not most privileges and immu-
nities clause decisions have concerned "the pursuit of a common calling").
211. To inform the term "fundamental" for purposes of privileges and immunities clause analy-
sis, one may look to what has been deemed fundamental for equal protection clause analysis,
although the Court has made it clear that the meaning of the term is not the same in both contexts,
See United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1028. For example, the right to work for the government is not
fundamental for equal protection clause purposes, see Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976) (per curiam), but for privileges and immunities clause purposes the privilege to pursue a
common calling is "one of the most fundamental." United Building, 104 S. Ct. at 1028. The Court's
explanation for this difference is inconsistent: Public employment is not fundamental for equal pro-
tection purposes because "it is a subspecies of the broader opportunity to pursue a common calling,"
id. at 1028; yet the Court goes on to say that in United Building the public works employment
opportunities at issue are fundamental precisely because government employment falls within this
broader fundamental right. See id. at 1029. Of course, if the meaning of "fundamental" were the
same for purposes of equal protection and privileges and immunities clause analyses, then the privi-
leges and immunities clause would be superfluous, the scope of its protection comprehended by the
strict scrutiny standard of equal protection. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973)
(woman's right to choose to have an abortion is "fundamental"; denial of that right is subject to
strict scrutiny); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (same as to right to travel); Williams
v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (same as to right to vote and first amendment rights); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (same as to right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (same as to right to procreate). The list of what Justice Washington
deemed "natural rights" in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230), is also
a source for determining what is "fundamental" for purposes of privileges and immunities clause
analysis. See supra note 209 (listing rights enumerated in Corfield v. Coryelb. This second approach
finds support in the Baldwin decision itself. See Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371, 387 (1978) (Justice Washington used the term "fundamental" in the modern sense as well
as in the natural rights sense); see also Antieau, supra note 189, at 10-15 (Corfield represented the
correct interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause). Contra Simson, supra note 189, at
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Finally, despite their common origin 212 and common concerns, 213
the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause provide
different sorts of protection. In essence, the privileges and immunities
clause guarantees personal rights to individuals moving from one state to
another,214 while the commerce clause protects the interstate flow of
commerce. 215 Because of this difference, for example, a state pricing
scheme requiring that all milk sold to consumers within a state be bought
from producers at a minimum price clearly violated the commerce
clause, even though it just as clearly treated resident and nonresident
milk producers equally.
216
Thus, the privileges and immunities clause cannot reach many pro-
tectionist measures that take the form of market participation and are
currently exempt from commerce clause scrutiny; nor can the equal pro-
tection clause.217 In conceiving the market participant test to allow
383-86 (the clause applies to any privilege or immunity granted to residents but denied to nonresi-
dents). Nonetheless, the precise scope of the term remains unclear and uninformed.
212. See, ag., Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978) (privi-
leges and immunities clause and commerce clause both have their source in fourth article of the
Articles of Confederation).
213. Compare H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949), in which the Court
observed:
Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer and every craftsman
shall be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to every
market in the Nation. . . . Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition
from every producing area in the nation to protect him from exploitation by any [one area,]
with Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948), in which the Court declared that the purpose
of the privileges and immunities clause was "to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independ-
ent, sovereign states. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the
same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy."
The constitutional protections for free movement of interstate commerce and equal treatment of
nonresidents of a state were believed necessary because nonresidents of a state, lacking the right to
vote in state elections, would otherwise be left to the "uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic
processes and official retaliation." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); cf Raymond Motor
Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978) (Court scrutinizes statutes that discriminate
against interstate commerce more carefully than those that burden commerce evenhandedly because
when local economic interests are burdened, as is often the case in evenhanded regulations, affected
citizens can use the state's political processes to curb abuse).
214. See supra note 213.
215. See id.
216. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 519 (1935) (statute required that no milk
be sold inside the state that was bought outside the state unless the out-of-state producers were paid
the same price which the state required to be paid to in-state milk producers); see also Hunt v.
Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 335, 352 (1977) (facially neutral North Car-
olina statute requiring that all apples sold there, regardless of their origin, be labelled only with
USDA grade, had a discriminatory impact on interstate commerce, and so violated the dormant
commerce clause.)
217. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also City of New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1976) ("[I]n the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the
wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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broader discretion to the states in their market activity, the Court has
unduly restricted the scope of the dormant commerce clause, creating a
gap through which protectionist measures may pass.
III. PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE MARKET PARTICIPANT
TEST AND TO THE PER SE RULE OF INVALIDITY
The market participant test allows the survival of protectionist
measures that take the form of market participation, even though in a
different form they would be summarily invalidated under the per se rule
of invalidity.2 18 This anomaly in current dormant commerce clause anal-
ysis results from the emphasis of the market participant test on the form
of state action rather than its intent or effect. To ensure that such ob-
structive state measures do not survive constitutional scrutiny, it is pro-
posed that both the market participant test and the per se rule of
invalidity be modified. The modifications attempt to coordinate these
two branches of dormant commerce clause doctrine and harmonize dor-
mant commerce clause analysis with the most recent Supreme Court de-
cisions addressing the "active commerce clause" 219 and the privileges
and immunities clause.
A. Description of Proposed Modifications.
1. The Market Participant Test. The market participant test
should be retained as a threshold inquiry in dormant commerce clause
analysis; the entire Court in Alexandria Scrap agreed that certain types of
state action are completely exempt from review under the dormant com-
merce clause.220 However, market participation should be more nar-
rowly and objectively defined.
The Court should abandon the current, unhelpful equation of mar-
ket participation with state proprietary action. 221 Instead, it should de-
fine market participation as occurring when the state enters the market
to buy goods or services for its own end use, or to sell goods or services
218. See supra notes 69-70, 95, 117-25 and accompanying text.
219. "Active commerce clause" refers to the affirmative grant of power to Congress contained in
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Compare the commerce clause in its dormant state, in which it acts as
an implicit check on the power of states to regulate interstate commerce, discussed supra notes 15-18
and accompanying text.
220. Cf supra note 44 (citing state court cases and a lower federal court case in which state
resident preferences in purchasing goods for state's own use or for use in public works withstood
commerce clause challenges).
221. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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wholly created by the state222 and maintained or produced through state
taxes and revenues.223 To be exempt as a market participant, the state
should bear the burden of proving that its purchasing or supplying pref-
erences have a sound economic basis, considering the state as a private
entity, without regard to the potential or actual economic benefits to its
citizens. In meeting this burden, the state must show that its preference
created an economic benefit that exceeded or was likely to exceed the
benefits obtainable from pursuing nondiscriminatory alternatives. This
revised test is designed to exempt state actions from commerce clause
strictures only when states behave in the form, and with the intent and
impact, of an economically rational private market force.
Under this proposal, on the facts of Reeves,224 South Dakota would
have to show that restricting sales of cement to South Dakotans en-
hanced state revenues beyond the increase that could be realized by rais-
ing its price to resident and nonresident customers alike. On the facts of
White, 225 Massachusetts would have to show that preferring bona fide
city residents in hiring created, for the state, an economic benefit in ex-
cess of that obtainable either by hiring without preference or by prefer-
ring the unemployed.
2. The Per Se Rule of Invalidity. Cases like South-Central Tim-
ber and Alexandria Scrap would not fall within the proposed market par-
ticipant test. Alaska's restriction on resale of state-owned timber does
not qualify as market participation because it was not a resident prefer-
ence. 22 6 Even if it were, the test would not apply, since it covers only
goods created by the state, not state-owned natural resources.
227
Although Maryland's repurchase of abandoned cars took the form of
market participation,228 it was not carried out with the intent of an eco-
nomically rational private trader. Maryland bought the cars not to use
them but to remove them from the highway, a goal of a state acting in its
222. Cf supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Blackmun's contention, in his
White dissent, that interference by the state with private economic relationships constitutes market
regulation, not market participation).
223. Cf supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussion in Reeves of whether channeling
benefits generated by state revenues for traditional state services back to the taxpayers is really
"protectionist").
224. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
226. Alaska would sell to both residents and non-residents as long as they agreed to process the
timber in state. See supra notes 134-49 and accompanying text.
227. Cf South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2245 (1984) (distin-
guishing Reeves as involving state restriction on a manufactured product, not a natural resource);
supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing Court's traditional suspicion of state restrictions
on natural resources).
228. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
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role as a guardian of the people.22 9
Nonetheless, programs like Maryland's represent creative programs
with laudable purposes and little impact on interstate commerce. As dis-
cussed, the very appeal of such programs may have prompted elabora-
tion of the market participant test in the first place. 230  Rather than
summarily invalidating state activity that discriminates against out-of-
state commerce, the Court should modify the per se rule of City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey.231
This modification subjects to heightened scrutiny those state actions
that, either in intent or in effect, 232 discriminate against interstate com-
merce or out-of-state businesses. Rather than automatically invalidating
such statutes, the modification requires that the state establish three ele-
ments: first, that its action is a valid exercise of its tenth amendment right
to promote the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens rather than a
purely protectionist measure;233 second, that its goal could be achieved in
no less discriminatory way; and, finally, that the local benefits of its ac-
tion outweigh the corresponding burden on interstate commerce.
234
Applied to Alexandria Scrap,235 the modified per se rule probably
would not invalidate the Maryland program. First, the Court recognized
229. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 24-40 and accompanying text.
232. Cf. supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing argument of Reeves dissent that
only those state actions which constitute an integral operation in the provision of traditional govern-
mental services be exempt from dormant commerce clause analysis).
233. Compare Justice Powell's dissent in Reeves, in which he argued that only those state actions
that constitute an "integral operation in areas of traditional governmental functions" should be ex-
empt from commerce clause scrutiny. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 449 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)).
234. The modification of the per se rule is the same as the approach taken in Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), which struck down a Madison regulation requiring that milk
sold as pasteurized be pasteurized and bottled within five miles of the city. The Court found that the
measure operated to erect "an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against competi-
tion from without the State, . . . plainly discriminat[ing] against interstate commerce. This it can-
not do, even in the exercise of its unquestioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if
reasonably nondiscriminatory alternatives. . . are available." Id. at 354 (footnote omitted).
As recently as 1977, the Court adopted the approach of Dean Milk in Hunt v. Washington
Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977), in which it struck down a North Carolina
statute preventing the sale of apples with any grade other than that of the USDA. "When discrimi-
nation against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated [either by the statute's intent or
effect], the burden falls on the State to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the
statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local inter-
ests at stake." Id. at 353; see also The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. Rnv. 57, 62-66
(1978) (advocating a return to the Dean Milk approach).
235. See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
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protection of the environment as a traditional state service.236 Second,
Maryland probably can show that no less discriminatory means could be
formulated to ensure that it was buying only autos abandoned on Mary-
land highways.
237
The New Jersey statute struck down in City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, prohibiting the importation of wastes originating outside the
state,238 would still fail under this modified per se rule. The Court in City
of Philadelphia expressly found that New Jersey could achieve protection
of its environment in a less discriminatory way: by limiting the amount
of waste, regardless of its origin, accepted by New Jersey landfills. 23
9
In summary, the proposed revisions allow the state to be exempt
from commerce clause scrutiny by demonstrating that its actions are like
those of a private market actor in intent and effect as well as in form.
Alternatively, when the state regulates the market instead of participat-
ing in it, it may discriminate against interstate commerce only in that
small area traditionally protected by the tenth amendment, and then only
when necessary. 24°
236. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
237. Cf. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 812 ("[I]n terms of likelihood, the Maryland Legislature
reasonably could assume that a hulk destroyed by a non-Maryland processor is more likely to have
been abandoned outside Maryland than is a hulk destroyed by a Maryland processor, and vice
versa.") Alexandria Scrap might then argue that Maryland could have achieved its goal through an
evenhanded approach, by seeking the more complete documentation required of non-Maryland
processors from all processors. It is doubtful, however, that such an evenhanded approach would
have provided an alternative; very few of the wreckers supplying non-Maryland processors could
meet the stricter requirements. Application of the stricter documentation requirement to all proces-
sors would nearly halt the supply of autos to the state. See id. at 801 n. 11 (citing the dramatic
decline in interstate movement of autos once the stricter documentation requirements were
implemented).
238. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
239. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626.
240. The proposed modifications attempt not only to resolve the anomaly that currently exists in
dormant commerce clause analysis, but also to harmonize dormant commerce clause doctrine as a
whole with the Court's most recent decisions addressing Congress's affirmative commerce clause
power, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
By equating market participation with state proprietary action-and, implicitly, market regula-
tion with governmental action-the current market participant test relies upon a distinction that the
Court last term expressly disapproved for purposes of constitutional analysis. See id. at 1014-16.
Although Garcia analyzed the commerce clause as an affirmative grant of power to Congress, and
not as an implicit check on the power of states, its reasons for rejecting the governmental/proprie-
tary distinction clearly apply to dormant commerce clause analysis.
In Garcia the Court determined that San Antonio's transit authority was subject to the mini-
mum wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, id. at 1020 (interpreting
scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act, § 6(a)(1),(6), (29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (x) (1982)), regardless of
whether mass transportation was a "traditional" or "nontraditional" state function. Garcia, 105 S.
Ct. at 1016. In so ruling, the Court expressly overruled its earlier holding in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). NationalLeague of Cities had held that Congress could not use
its commerce clause power to impose wage and overtime requirements on states "in areas of tradi-
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B. Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations.
In South-Central Timber, the plurality recognized that, unless lim-
ited, the market participant test enables states to circumvent judicial re-
straints imposed pursuant to the commerce clause. 241 Next term the
Court confronts a state's attempt to use the test to avoid congressional
statutory constraints enacted pursuant to the commerce clause. 242 In
Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc., the Court will address whether federal legislation under commerce
clause authority reaches market participation by states.243 Faced with a
choice between applying the market participant test to reduce Congress's
commerce clause power over states and limiting the test to manageable
tional governmental functions." Id. at 852. In a complete reversal, the Garcia Court concluded that
the traditional/nontraditional distinction was unworkable and fundamentally inconsistent with es-
tablished principles of federalism. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1016.
The Garcia Court drew a direct parallel between its decision to abandon the traditional/non-
traditional distinction in commerce clause analysis and its earlier decision in New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 583 (1946), to reject the governmental/proprietary distinction that underlay
state immunity from taxation. The two sets of distinctions are essentially synonymous, the Garcia
Court reasoned. See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1012-13. Courts had been unable to give "principled
content" to either. Id. Their inability was due in part to the vagueness of the terms. See id. at 1014.
There was, however,
a more fundamental problem at work here, a problem that explains why the Court was
never able to provide a basis for the governmental/proprietary distinction in the intergov-
ernmental tax immunity cases and why an attempt to draw similar distinctions with re-
spect to federal regulatory authority under National League of Cities is unlikely to succeed
regardless of how the distinctions are phrased. The problem is that neither the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction nor any other that purports to separate out important govern-
mental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic society ...
[Both sets of distinctions] inevitably invite[ ] an unelected federal judiciary to make deci-
sions about which state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes.
Id. at 1015.
By equating the governmental/proprietary and traditional/nontraditional distinctions, and by
basing its holding upon principles of federalism, Garcia clearly implies that the current definition of
market participation as "proprietary" state activity is invalid as a matter of constitutional law. The
proposed revision of the term responds to this problem by supplying a narrower, more obiective
definition.
241. See South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2246 (1984)
("Unless the 'market' [for purposes of the market participant test] is relatively narrowly defined, the
doctrine has the potential of swallowing up the rule that States may not impose substantial burdens
on interstate commerce even if they act with the permissible state purpose of fostering local
industry.").
242. See Gould, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations, 750 F.2d 608,
612-13 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendants arguing that preemption analysis is inapposite where state is
acting like market participant), prob. juris, noted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (U.S. May 20, 1985).
243. Before both the district court and the court of appeals, Wisconsin argued that as a market
participant its activity was free from preemption by commerce clause enactments. See id.; Gould, 576
F. Supp. 1290, 1296 n.7 (W.D. Wis. 1983), aff'd in relevant part, 750 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984).
Therefore, the Supreme Court must address this argument before it considers whether the National
Labor Relations Act preempts the state actions.
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bounds, the Court should use this opportunity to resolve the unsettled
state of dormant commerce clause doctrine.
The issue arises from Gould's challenge to Wisconsin statutes that
blacklisted recidivist violators of labor laws. 244 Under the scheme, Wis-
consin's labor agency compiled a list of persons and firms that had vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act three or more times within the
past five years. 24 5 Each name was to remain on the list for three years.
246
During that time, the state "[would] not purchase any product known to
be manufactured or sold by any person or firm included on the list.
''247
As one of the firms blacklisted, Gould sought to have the district court
declare Wisconsin's program unconstitutional, arguing that by virtue of
the supremacy clause, the National Labor Relations Act preempted the
state laws.24 8 Both the district court249 and the Seventh Circuit 25 o agreed
with Gould and held the statutes unconstitutional on these grounds.
In characterizing its refusal to deal with labor law violators as mar-
ket participation, Wisconsin seeks to broaden the test in two ways. First,
it argues that market participation should be exempt from congressional
enactments under commerce clause authority.251 Previously the test has
only limited courts' exercise of the dormant commerce clause.252 Sec-
ond, Wisconsin contends that as a market participant, it may not only
choose to favor state residents over nonresidents, it may also choose its
244. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 101.245 (Supp. 1985) (requiring Department of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations to compile a list of labor law violators); id. § 16.75(8) (1985) (providing that the
state would not purchase from those on list).
245. Id. § 101.245(1).
246. Id. § 101.245(4).
247. Id. § 16.75(8).
248. See Gould, 576 F. Supp. at 1292; Gould, 750 F.2d at 610.
249. Gould, 576 F. Supp. at 1298-99. In concluding that the Court in Alexandria Scrap ex-
pressly limited the market participant test to dormant commerce clause analysis, id. at 1296 n.7, the
district court appears to misread Alexandria Scrap. The Court in Alexandria Scrap expressly de-
clined to express its view "on whether Congress could prohibit the type of selective participation in
the market undertaken by Maryland." Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810 n.19.
250. Gould, 750 F.2d at 615. The Seventh Circuit, like the district court, concluded that the
market participant test only applies in dormant commerce clause analysis, and not where Congress
has legislated. Id. at 612-13.
251. See Gould, 576 F. Supp. at 1296 n.7; see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S.
794, 822 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (foreshadowing this argument by admitting "logical
difficulty" understanding why, if Maryland's program was not the kind of action with which the
commerce clause is concerned, "there can be any congressional power to legislate in this area").
252. In the earliest market participant test case, the Court expressly reserved the issue whether
the test applied in areas in which Congress had legislated. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426
U.S. 749, 810 n. 19 (1976). In the latest market participant case, the plurality's statement of the test
seemed to limit it to dormant commerce clause analysis. South Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wun-
nicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (1984) ("Our cases make clear that if a State is acting as a market
participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation
on its activities.") (emphasis added).
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trading partners based on other criteria, in this case, compliance with the
National Labor Relations Act.
25 3
Both arguments find support in the broad terms with which the
Court first fashioned the market participant test. Because the Court de-
scribed the test as a limitation on the scope of the commerce clause itself,
and not merely on the courts' authority under the dormant commerce
clause,254 Wisconsin may logically argue that Congress's authority under
the clause reaches no farther than the courts'. Futhermore, because the
test focuses solely on the form of state action rather than its intent,255 it
follows that the basis on which the state chooses its trading partners is
irrelevant.2
5 6
Although the broad terms of the Court's decisions support Wiscon-
sin's argument, it is unlikely to succeed. Accepting Wisconsin's argu-
ment would fence off a limitless area of state action that could not be
reached by Congress through the exercise of its most potent authority.25
7
Moreover, it would leave courts to determine the permissible bounds of
253. See Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement at 10 ("Wisconsin chooses not to do business with
recidivist labor law violators. "), Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould,
Inc., 750 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1984), prob. juris noted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3824 (U.S. May 20, 1985). Wis-
consin asserts that the purpose of blacklisting is to promote compliance wiih the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). Gould, 750 F.2d at 611. Nonetheless, it has attempted
to characterize its objective as a desire to "influence," not "regulate," relationships between recidi-
vists and their employees. Id. at 613.
254. See, e.g. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983)
("Alexandria Scrap and Reeves, therefore, stand for the proposition that when a state or local gov-
ernment enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce
Clause."); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) ("[T]he Commerce Clause responds
principally to state taxes and regulatory measures. . . . There is no indication of a constitutional
plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate freely in the free market."); Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808-09 (commerce clause not intended to prohibit state's
entry into the market to trade with its own citizens). But cf South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (1984) ("Our cases make clear that if a State is acting as a market
participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation
on its activities.") (emphasis added); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 n.19
(1976) (expressly reserving issue whether market participant test applied in areas in which Congress
had legislated).
255. See supra notes 61, 76, 113-25 and accompanying text.
256. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 208 (1984) ("[I]n
this kind of case there is a single inquiry: whether the challenged program constituted direct state
participation in the market.") (quoting Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 n.7 (1980)).
257. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) (referring to the "embracing and pene-
trating nature" of the commerce clause power); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
19, at 138 (interpretation of the commerce clause "has played a significant role in shaping concepts
of federalism and the permissible uses of national power"); for examples of the breadth of Congress's
commerce clause authority, see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005,
1020 (1985) (holding federal wage and hour provisions applicable to city's mass transit operations);
Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-29 (1981) (Congress's commerce clause authority extends to
protection of farmland from effects of surface mining); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-57
(1971) (Congress's commerce clause authority extends to proscription of loan-sharking); Heart of
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Congress's commerce clause authority on the basis of the distinction be-
tween market participation and market regulation, a result clearly incon-
sistent with the Court's latest commerce clause decision.
25 8
Nonetheless, it is unclear how the Court can use the market partici-
pant test in its present form to prevent Wisconsin from succeeding.259 In
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (upholding Congress's exercise of
commerce clause power to prohibit discrimination in public accomodations).
258. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1007 (1985), the
Court rejected the use of the distinction between "traditional" and "nontraditional" state functions
to limit Congress's commerce clause authority. As argued supra note 240, the distinction between
market participation and regulation is as untenable and inconsistent with federalism as that between
traditional and nontraditional state functions.
259. If the Court does not revise the market participant test, it will probably find that Wiscon-
sin's refusal to deal with recidivist labor law violators does not fall within the restrictive definition of
market participation announced in South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237
(1984), the most recent Supreme Court case addressing the test. See generally supra notes 129-62.
In that case the plurality said: "The State may not impose conditions, whether by statute, regula-
tion, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular market." South-
Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46. The purpose of Wisconsin's statute was precisely to affect
economic relationships between private businesses and their employees. See Gould, 750 F.2d at 611
(purpose to encourage employers to comply with NLRA). The effect was clearly regulatory because
Wisconsin's statutes expressly incorporated federal regulation and encouraged compliance with that
regulation. Id. Since, like Alaska, Wisconsin has attempted "to govern the private, separate eco-
nomic relationships of its trading partners," South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2246, its actions,
like those of Alaska, do not constitute market participation and are subject to commerce clause
constraints. Cf Appellee's Brief at 35-37, Gould, No. 84-1484 (U.S. prob. juris. noted May 20, 1985)
(distinguishing South-Central Timber on this basis); Brief for the National Labor Relations Board as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Appelle at 25-26, Gould, No. 84-1484 (U.S. prob. juris. noted May 20,
1985) (same).
Wisconsin's attempt to characterize blacklisting as market participation may fail even under the
broader view of the test taken by the majority in White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employ-
ers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983), discussed supra notes 110-28. That decision, like South-Central Timber,
recognized that "there are some limits on a state or local government's ability to impose restrictions
that reach beyond the immediate parties with which the government transacts business." White, 460
U.S. at 211 n.7 (1983). Although White did not further define these limits, and although members
of the Court disagree on their bounds, see South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2246, n.10; id. at 2248
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7; id. at 217 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part),
White clearly implies that state actions affecting only a "discrete, identifiable class of economic activ-
ity in which the city is a major participant" do not transgress these limits. White, 460 U.S. at 211
n.7. Wisconsin's statutory program leaps beyond these limits. It affects all of the employees of all of
the employers who are subject to the NLRA and who supply the types of goods or services for which
Wisconsin enters the market. The facts of Gould highlight the potentially far-reaching impact of
Wisconsin's program. At the time its name was placed on the blacklist, the Gould Corporation no
longer owned the divisions whose violations earned it a place there. Gould, 750 F.2d at 610. Wis-
consin then canceled contracts made with two divisions of Gould that had not repeatedly violated
the NLRA and were not located in Wisconsin. Id. As the Seventh Circuit noted, one may further
appreciate the impact of allowing blacklisting practices by imagining different blacklisting criteria
adopted by each of the fifty states. See id. at 612. In fact, at least four other states have enacted
similar legislation barring the awarding of state contracts to employers found by a federal court of
appeals to have violated the NLRA. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-57a (West Supp. 1985)
(three-time violators); MD. STATE FIN. & PROCUREMENT CODE ANN. § 13-404 (1985) (persons
held in contempt for violations); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.322-.324 (West Supp. 1985)
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contrast, under the proposed modification to the test, Wisconsin's pro-
gram clearly fails. First, the test as revised clearly applies only in dor-
mant commerce clause analysis and does not act as a restraint on
congressional authority.260 This revision recognizes that the Court cre-
ated the test to curtail judicial, not federal, interference with state eco-
nomic activity.261 Furthermore, under the proposed test, a state
participating in the market may only choose with whom it will deal on
the basis of residency; it may not choose its trading partners on any other
basis. This revision accommodates the state's conflicting duties to fur-
ther the welfare of its own citizens and to honor the framers' intent to
ensure a nationwide marketplace.2 62
IV. CONCLUSION
Present constitutional doctrine does not ensure that states further
legitimate local objectives only in ways that do not impermissibly dis-
criminate against interstate commerce. Recent developments in the dor-
mant commerce clause doctrine have at once constricted and rigidified
application of the clause. As a result, clearly protectionist state measures
bypass commerce clause scrutiny. They are not held in check by the
(three-time violators); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 121.23 (Page 1984) (held in contempt more than
once); cf ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1402 (Supp. 1984) (willful or repeated OSHA violators),
260. See supra text at note 220. In contrast, it is not clear at present whether the market partici-
pant test only applies in dormant commerce clause analysis or, instead, also limits Congress's exer-
cise of commerce clause authority. See supra note 252.
261. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) ("IT]he competing considerations in
cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and diffi-
cult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis. Given these factors, Alexandria Scrap
wisely recognizes that. . . the adjustment of interests. . . is a task better suited for Congress than
this Court.").
The proposal to restrict the market participant test to dormant commerce clause analysis also
recognizes that dormant commerce clause doctrine as a whole is essentially a judicial creation. See
supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. By defining the test as a limit on judicial power under the
commerce clause, it at once recognizes that state legislatures should have more leeway to address
local concerns, and at the same time places on Congress more responsibility to inform its silences.
Using the test to restrain Congress's exercise of commerce authority, as Wisconsin seeks to do, leads
to the opposite result. It encourages courts alternatively to favor state or federal legislative policies
by labeling state statutes "participation" or "regulation." The Court abandoned such superlegisla-
tive control over state and federal economic legislation long ago. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (state legislation). As for federal legislation, see, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942) ("At the beginning Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce
power with a breadth never yet exceeded. . . . He made emphatic the embracing and penetrating
nature of this power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise must proceed from political
rather than from judicial processes.") (citations omitted); see also id. at 129 (economic conflicts
"rarely lend themselves to judicial determination").
262. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 442 (1980) (quoted supra text accompanying note
106); see also supra note 10 (defining protectionism).
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equal protection clause, nor, despite its recent extension, by the privileges
and immunities clause.
Accordingly, this note has argued that the commerce clause should
allow the states to prefer state residents only when they behave both in
form and intent like a private market actor. Alternatively, when states
do not act like market participants, discrimination against interstate
commerce should be tolerated only when it is necessary to achieve a le-
gitimate local objective.
Richard H. Seamon
